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The February 1974 newsletter of the Michigan Association for 
Consumer Protection (MACP), a small citizens' group, contained a 
half-page critique of a state senator who was "Chairman of the 
subcommittee that has power to kill consumer protection bill 
4001."1 The critique's author, Walter Benkert, president of MACP, 
called the contents of the senator's 1973-74 report "garbage," and 
went on to attack the senator as "support[ing] the business prefer-
ences over the people's need for protection."2 Benkert concluded 
that House Bill "4001 will either die in committee or become a 
watered down bill .... "3 The newsletter closed with a verse com-
memorating MACP's recent struggle over mobile home safety and 
noting the organization's intentions to continue fighting for con-
sumer rights.4 
Shortly after the newsletter was issued, a member of the Michi-
gan House of Representatives sent a letter to the director of the 
Michigan State Police, requesting the director to "note the attached 
.. Associate Professor of Law & Director of Clinical Programs, Golden Gate University 
School of Law. B.A., 1960, University of Illinois; J.D., 1963, Northwestern University. The 
author wishes to extend deepest gratitude to his co-counsel and comrades in this work: 
Attorneys George Corsetti, Margaret Nichols, and Richard Soble. They are responsible in 
innumerable ways for whatever good and helpful ideas this Article might contain, as well as 
for providing the author constant support. 
1. MICH. Assoc. FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION, NEWSLETTER, Feb. 1974, at 1. The full four-
page mimeograph newsletter is attached as an appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief in Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. 
Ct., Mich., filed July 26, 1974). 
House Bill 4001, the "Michigan Consumer Protection Act," authorized the Attorney 
General to combat deceptive and unfair trade practices by seeking injunctive relief, restitu-
tion, recovery of investigation costs, and civil penalties. The bill was introduced in the 
Michigan House on January 10, 1973, was passed by the House as amended, on January ao, 
1974, and was passed by the Michigan Senate on December 15,1976. See MICH. COMPo LAWS 
§ 445.901 (Supp. 1977). 
2. NEWSLETI'ER, supra note 1, at 1. 
3. ld. 
4. ld. at 4. 
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[newsletter] from the Michigan Association for Consumer Protec-
tion, I would like to know what this organization is."s The letter also 
requested information on Benkert, the MACP president and author 
of the critique. Less than two weeks later, the Intelligence Section 
of the Michigan State Police sent a memo to the director. The memo 
summarized and quoted from the MACP's articles of incorporation 
(filed with the State Department of the Treasury), and concluded: 
"We have no information that the group is subversive or violent."6 
A copy of this memo found its way to the criticized senator,1 and 
the matter appeared closed. 
Thereafter, a member of the MACP discovered that the Michi-
gan State Police had been making inquiries concerning the activi-
ties and political views of the group and its members.8 The result 
of this revelation was Benkert v. Michigan State Police,9 a suit 
challenging the legality of such a politically motivated inquiry, as 
well as attacking the entire "subversive investigations" apparatus 
of the state police. Following publicity about the suit10 and the 
police admission that the "inquiry" was "unauthorized,"11 the com-
plaint was amended to greatly expand the suit. 12 It has since pro-
ceeded with fourteen plaintiffs as representatives of "a class action 
which seeks to declare the existence and operation of the Michigan 
State Police and Detroit Police 'subversive units' illegal and uncon-
stitutional; to enjoin their continued existence and operation; and 
to enjoin a wide range of illegal and unconstitutional police activ-
5. A copy of the letter sent to Colonel Plants, Director of the Michigan State Police, 
by Representative Huffman, on February 22, 1974, was also forwarded to the state senator 
who was the subject of criticism in the MACP newsletter. The letter to Colonel Plants is 
attached as an appendix to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 1. 
6. This memo is attached as an appendix to Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 1. 
7. Id. 
8. George Corsetti, a member of MACP, indicated, in an interview with the author on 
March I, 1975, that an official of a state agency concerned with consumer affairs contacted 
him and related that the state police had inquired ofthe official concerning the political views 
of the MACP and its members. 
9. Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., 
Mich., filed July 26, 1974). 
10. Detroit Free Press, July 27, 1974, at 3, col. 2; Detroit News, Oct. 20, 1974, at 2B, 
col. 1; Detroit News, Aug. 29, 1974, at 9A, col. 2. 
11. See Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Benkert 
v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Aug. 8, 
1974) at 3. See also Detroit Free Press, Aug. 24, 1974, at col. 2 Detroit Free Press, Sept. 28, 
1974, at 7 A, col. 1. 
12. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Benkert v. Michi-
gan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Apr. 8, 1975) 
Ihereinafter cited as First Amended Complaint]. The expansion of the lawsuit to include 
the Detroit Police Dep't was the result of investigation by plaintiff's counsel which revealed 
facts indicating extensive political surveillance by the Detroit Police. 
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ity."13 The complaint further alleged that this spy apparatus oper-
ated primarily against those who expressed "political, economic, 
religious, social or other unpopular or critical views" in "lawful, 
peaceful and constitutionally protected" ways.14 That criminality 
was not the focus of this police surveillance was explicitly alleged.15 
The specific factual allegations by plaintiffs in Benkert were 
wide ranging, encompassing numerous police illegalities in addition 
to the allegation that the state police served as political police for a 
state legislator .16 The complaint asserted numerous violations of the 
United States and Michigan constitutions and laws, and sought 
wide-ranging relief.17 The most significant thrust of the complaint 
focused on first amendment rights and values. It asserted that un-
less relief were granted, 
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of association, freedom to petition ... 
government ... [and] right to privacy ... will continue 
to be infringed, threatened, impeded, penalized, and other-
wise interfered with by defendants. . . .18 
Additional constitutional and statutory questions were raised by the 
allegations, but it is the first amendment issues that are pertinent 
to the analysis undertaken in this Article. 
This Article in no way intends to litigate vicariously the signifi-
cant issues raised in Benkert. The brief discussion of that case is to 
provide some background for an understanding of the empirical 
study and analytical discussion that follows. It is hoped that this 
Article will help relieve the first amendment dilemma posed by 
secret police intelligence apparatuses through a study and analysis 
of over seven hundred pages of police political intelligence docu-
ments obtained through discovery in Benkert. 
II. JUDICIAL COMMENT ON POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE 
Before proceeding to the study and analysis of police political 
intelligence documents, consider the present first amendment di-
lemma posed by police surveillance of political activity. Judicial 
examination of first amendment values involved in political intellig-
ence gathering has been called inadequate by an earlier commenta-
13. First Amended Complaint, supra note 12 at 111. 
14. [d. 11 22B. 
15. [d. 
16. [d. 11 30-78. 
17. [d. 11 79. 
18. [d. 
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tor .19 In discussing only one aspect of the intelligence gathering pro-
cess, that commentator concluded that "police use of undercover 
agents has been considered in only the most superficial fashion."20 
The passage of a few years, the Supreme Court decision in Laird v. 
Tatum,21 and the post-Watergate cases22 do not detract from the 
validity of this conclusion. 
In a flurry of activity beginning with Anderson v. Sills,23 in 
1969, courts have been confronted with many first amendment con-
cerns of political surveillance and dossier maintenance. The Su-
preme Court provided its primary comment on this subject in 1972, 
with Laird v. Tatum. 24 By 1975, three additional significant opin-
ions had been added-Philadelphia Yearly Meeting v. Tate, 25 
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,26 and White v. Davis. 21 
The "first major court test"28 of a political intelligence appara-
tus was in Anderson v. Sills,29 a case raising issues "on the perimeter 
of first amendment doctrine."30 It involved the "right-or-wrong of 
the police to maintain dossiers on political dissidents."31 
In April 1968, New Jersey Attorney General Sills issued a mem-
orandum entitled, "Civil Disorders-The Role of Local, County, 
and State Government," to municipal and county officials within 
19. Note, Police Undercouer Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms. 37 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 634, 637 (1969). "To say that the Supreme Court has not dealt adequately 
with the threat of police undercover agents is not to single it out for criticism; in general, 
neither legislatures nor police administrative authorities have performed any more satisfacto-
rily." Id. 
20. Id. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). In these cases. not involving 
first amendment considerations. the use of informers and undercover agents in criminal 
investigations was approved. This view has been reaffirmed in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 
U. S. 545 (1977). See also United States v. White. 401 U. S. 745 (1971); Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969). (Both White and Alderman evaluated electronic surveillance in 
light of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches. See generally Stone, 
The Scope af the Fourth Amendment: Priuacy and Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents and 
Informers, 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 1193. 
21. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
22. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
23. 106 N.J. Super. 545, 265 A.2d 298 (1969), reu'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). 
24. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
25. 382 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975). 
26. 387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.), uacated on condition, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.). 
application for stay denied, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974). 
27. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975). 
28. Comment, Political Surueillance and Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights, 
Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 175, quoting New York Times, June 2,1970, at 1. 
col. 2. 
29. 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (1969), reu'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). 
30. Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment Adjudication. 
22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970). 
31. Id. 
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New Jersey.32 Undoubtedly prompted in part by a "number of civil 
disorders" in New Jersey during 1967, as well as more general con-
cerns over, and resistance to, social demands of the sixties, the 
memorandum dealt "with many aspects of the problem of civil dis-
order, including methods of planning, mutual assistance between 
municipalities,"33 and other aspects of prevention and control of 
civil disorders. The Sills plan included the expansion and coordina-
tion of local and state intelligence activities. Standarized forms 
(Nos. 420 and 421) were distributed to every police department in 
the state, with instructions to "routinely" submit these forms, and 
the "vital intelligence" therein, to the "State Police Control Secu-
rity Unit."34 
Form 420, the Incident Report Form, called for reports on antic-
ipated, in progress, and completed incidents, which include a 
"[c]ivil disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, 
confrontation .... "35 Requested were the full details on individu-
als and organizations involved in those incidents, along with the 
political designation of all the organizations.36 Form 421 was utilized 
for reporting personal data on any individual who, in the judgment 
of a local police officer, "may be connected with potential civil 
disorder problems."37 
The plaintiffs in Anderson-civil rights, anti-war, and com-
munity activists-challenged the constitutionality of Attorney Gen-
eral Sills' reporting system. They requested an injunction against 
the surveillance activities of police, and the destruction of dossiers 
maintained under the Sills system.38 After disposing of assertions 
that plaintiffs lacked standing, the trial court considered the "secret 
c 
files" mandated by the Sills memorandum to be "inherently dan-
gerous" and by their "existence tend[ed] to restrict those who 
32. See Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 547, 256 A.2d 298, 299 (1969). 
33. Id. at 548, 256 A.2d at 299. See also Comment, Secret Files: Legitimate Police 
Activity or Unconstitutional Restraint on Dissent?, 58 GEO. L.J. 569 (1970). Anderson has 
been the object of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Comment, Chilling Political Expression 
by Use of Police Intelligence Files: Anderson v. Sills, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 
71 (1970) (trial court decison); Comment, Political Surveillance and Police Intelligence Gath-
ering-Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 175; Comment, Protective Intellig-
ence Systems and the Courts, 58 CAL. L. REv. 915 (1970). 
34. 56.N.J. at 218, 265 A.2d at 682. 
35. 106 N.J. Super. at 548, 256 A.2d at 306. Forms 420 and 421, and the accompanying 
instructions, are set out in full in the appendices to the decision. Id. at 558-66, 256 A.2d at 
305-13. 
36. "EXAMPLES OF TYPES: Left wi!lg, Right wing, Civil Rights, Militant, National-
istic, Pacifist, Religious, Black Power, Ku Klux Klan, Extremist, etc." Id. at 548, 256 A.2d 
at 307. 
37. Id. at 549, 256 A.2d at 300. 
38. Id .. at 547, 256 A.2d at 299. 
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would advocate, within protected areas, political and social 
changes."39 Since the attack on Sills' system was "on its face" (Le., 
as described in the memorandum, without regard to actual police 
practices or purposes), and since "there are no relevant issues of fact 
which must be determined, "40 the trial court proceeded by summary 
judgment to grant the prayed for relief in full. 41 
Although conceding that "the objects of the actions of the At-
torney General taken he:re are well within the established police 
power of the State, "42 the trial court found three separate first 
amendment deficiencies. First, the Attorney General had not borne 
the necessary burden of establishing a substantial relation between 
information sought and a subject of overriding or compelling state 
interest.43 A sufficient "nexus" between the reporting system and 
the prevention of civil disorder was not established.44 Second, the 
"impact of the ... official act" on "those who would not complain 
because of the chilling effect" outweighed the "governmental goals 
[of] controlling unprotected and illegal conduct," and therefore 
constituted an impermissible infringement on first amendment 
rights.45 Third, the official action in this case went "beyond areas 
reasonably necessary to reach the permissible governmental goal."46 
The trial court concluded that the memorandum and reporting 
forms "overreach in their attempt to achieve" governmental goals, 
both explicitly and because of the "lack of standards" for use of the 
forms.47 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court,48 indi-
cating that "[h]ere we are dealing with the critical power of govern-
ment to gather intelligence to ena.ble it to satisfy the very reason for 
its being, "49 and that, therefore, "the basic approach must be that 
the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasona-
bly believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police 
39. [d. at 557-58, 256 A.2d at 305. 
40. [d. at 549, 256 A.2d at 300. The only factual issues determined by the trial court 
concerned plaintiffs' standing, and those were quickly resolved by judicial notice of the 
plaintiffs' political activities. 
41. [d. at 558, 256 A.2d at 305. 
42. [d. at 552, 256 A.2d at 302. 
43. [d. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 
(1963). 
44. 106 N.J. Super. at 553-55, 256 A.2d at 302. 
45. [d. at 555, 256 A.2d at 303. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304. 
48. 56 N.J. at 231, 265 A.2d at 689. 
49. [d. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687. 
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roles."50 The court expressed a very restrictive view of the issues51 
and indicated the impropriety of resolving the case by summary 
judgment. 52 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, whether addressing the issue 
of summary judgment or plaintiffs' standing, made clear its pre-
sumptive approval of the challenged police conduct and its disbelief 
of plaintiffs' concerns.53 The court indicated that a constitutional 
challenge to the police conduct in question would be sustained only 
if the wrongful conduct was "real and not fanciful"54 and that, in 
this case, plaintiffs' allegations were: "merely hypothetical, "55 
"academic,"56 or "a figment of fear that the government itself may 
run amuck."57 
The trial court and New Jersey Supreme Court opinions in 
Anderson are archetypal of subsequent opinions in police spy litiga-
tion, and illustrate what has been characterized as the "rights-
security spectrum."58 In confronting constitutional attacks on police 
surveillance of political activity, courts (or judges) initially make a 
significant value choice, between first amendment rights and public 
or state security, and then employ almost automatically a complex 
of presumptions about police and citizen behavior. 
The court's avenue of approach to the rights-security spectrum 
is again exemplified by contrasting the majority and dissenting 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Laird v. Tatum. 59 
50. Id. at 229, 265 A.2d at 688. 
51. See Comment, Political Surveillance and Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights, 
Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 175, 177, quoting 56 N.J. at 226,265 A.2d at 687. 
52. 56 N.J. at 215, 265 A.2d at 681. "[Tjhe issue as projected by plaintiffs on motion 
for summary judgment was a mere abstraction." Id. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687. 
53. Id. at 215, 218, 265 A.2d at 681, 682. After six years of negotiation and preparation 
for trial, the complaint in Anderson was dismissed on alternative grounds. Since the Anderson 
memorandum had been superceded and was no longer in effect, the case was declared moot. 
The court also stated that even if the complaint was not moot it failed to state a cause of 
action under the first amendment. Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (1976). 
54. 56 N.J. at 220,265 A.2d at 684. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687. 
57. Id. at 229, 265 A.2d at 689. 
58. Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973). 
There has been detected a tendency in recent times to justify invasion of constitu-
tional rights on the basis of national security .... The tendency has not been wholly 
recent of course ... I start with the premise-and I suspect the majority would not 
disagree with the premise, though the majority opinion commences at the other end 
of the rights-security spectrum-that a group, even a huge group, of people who want 
to go to the seat of government to protest a war and who do so peaceably have the 
right not to have their name ... listed in some dossier or table or catalog ofprotes-
ters and disseminated throughout all the major branches of the "security system" of 
the United States. 
Id. at 334, (Oakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
59. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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This case, like Anderson, involved a broad-based challenge to the 
Army's surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity. 
The litigation was admittedly prompted in part by a magazine arti-
cle by a former Army intelligence agent.60 The case unearthed an 
Army "intelligence system ... aimed principally at gathering in-
formation about dissident domestic political activity, "61 and numer-
ous resulting abuses.62 In Tatum, the Supreme Court addressed the 
Issue: 
whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked 
by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his first 
amendment right is being chilled by the mere existence, 
without more, of a governmental investigative and data-
gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope 
than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a 
valid governmental purpose.63 
• 
The Court found the "allegations of a subjective 'chill'''64 inade-
quate to substitute "for a claim of specific present objective harm 
or a threat of specific future harm. . . . "65 The plaintiffs therefore 
lacked federal standing, and the district court's dismissal was rein-
stated.66 
The Supreme Court considered two aspects of federal justicia-
bility other than standing. It hinted at considerations of 
"mootness," or at least substantial change in circumstances making 
the complaint staleY The Court also addressed political question 
concerns, and announced deference to the Army while criticizing the 
appellate court's conclusion that it could "hear evidence, ascertain 
facts, and decide what, if any, further restrictions. . . are called for 
to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of activity .... "68 
Federal courts are not the "monitors of the wisdom and soundness 
of Executive action," the court stated; that role is "appropriate for 
the Congress acting through its committees and the 'power of the 
GO. [d. at 2 n.l. "The complaint filed in the District Court candidly asserted that its 
factual allegations were based on a magazine article: 'The information contained in the 
foregoing paragraphs numered five through thirteen [of the complaint] was published in the 
January 1970 issue of the magazine The Washington Monthly' .... " [d. 
1. Note, Judicial Review of Military Surveillance of Civilians: Big Brother Wears Mod-
ern Army Green, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1972). 
62. [d. 1010-11. 
63. 408 U.S. at 10. 
64. [d. at 13-14. 
65. [d. at 14. 
66. [d. at 26. 
67. Military Surveillance, supra note 61, at 1013 n.45. 
68. 408 U.S. at 15. 
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purse' . ."69 The Court indicated that judicial intervention may 
be appropriate where "actual present or immediately threatened 
injury resulted[ed] from unlawful government action."70 
In Tatum, the "subjective chill" alleged by plaintiffs was insuf-
ficient to warrant their standing.7t The Court distinguished prior 
first amendment cases from the present case, noting that the past 
first amendment "chilling" resulted from "regulations, proscrip-
tions or compulsions,"72 none of which was involved in the Army's 
political intelligence apparatus.73 Nevertheless, the manner in 
which the Court deals with the tripartite avoidance gambit-
political question, standing, mootness-all present a restrictive 
view of the first amendment concerns involved. Chief Justice 
Burger carefully steps through a lengthy court of appeals opinion, 
quotes only those phrases supporting denial of review, seems to 
ignore those phrases pressing otherwise, and then, after stating the 
appellate court conclusion, finds that the appellate court "decided 
the issue incorrectly."74 
The dissent of Justice Douglas in Tatum expressed two con-
cerns unmentioned by the majority. First, there was no implied 
authority in the constitution for military surveillance over civilians, 
and Congress had passed "no law authorizing surveillance over ci-
vilians . . . . "75 Justice Douglas concluded, therefore, that there 
was absolutely no basis for sustaining any military intrusion in this 
area. Second, Justice Douglas addressed the majority's concerns of 
standing. Under his perception of the facts, the Army's surveillance 
activities were "paralyzing," and plaintiffs' first amendment injury 
was certainly "not a remote, imaginary" one.76 
The opposed ends of the rights-security spectrum are exempli-
fied by the two opinions in Tatum. The majority of the Court viewed 
the case from the "security" end of the spectrum, as did the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Anderson, resulting in a maze of security 
assumptions and lack of standing for plaintiffs. The Tatum dissent, 
however, like the trial court in Anderson, placed free expression 
values in the traditional "preferred position," a view from the 
"rights" end of the same spectrum that would have permitted the 
court to forthrightly address the first amendment issues raised. 
69. [d. 
70. See Military Surveillance, supra note 61, at 1025-28. 
71. 408 U.S. at 13. 
72. [d. at 16. 
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Mter Anderson and Tatum, it appeared that the courts were 
not ready to impose constitutional restrictions on police surveillance 
of political activity. Three recent opinions indicate that the courts 
may have reconsidered this position; all sustained claims of 
"corruption of the democratic process"77 caused by political surveil-
lance as justiciable. 
The first of these three cases was Socialist Workers Party v. 
Attorney General,78 in which the trial court awarded plaintiffs a 
short-lived victory. In the context of an ongoing omnibus suit at-
tacking wide ranging "illegal surveillance and harassment"79 of the 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP) by various governmental officials 
and agencies (during which a past FBI program of disruptive activi-
ties at SWP and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) conventions was 
revealed) ,80 the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to pro-
hibit FBI surveillance of an upcoming YSA convention scheduled 
for December 28, 1974.81 The trial court, noting that a "principal 
use" of the information gathered by the FBI was to deter govern-
ment employment and that "FBI surveillance would inevitably put 
a substantial inhibition and barrier upon the normal carrying out 
of these meetings and the normal ability to attract young persons 
to attend them," granted plaintiffs' request on December 13, 1974.82 
Eleven days later, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's 
declaration of "a substantial impairment of the First Amendment 
rights" of the SWP and the YSA, and the finding of "no compelling 
interest and no other necessity" for FBI surveillance of the conven-
tion.83 The court of appeals was not persuaded by the admitted 
program of disruption against the SWP, and found the surveillance 
justified by national security concerns. The appellate court's opin-
ion relying primarily on in camera inspection of FBI materials, was 
77. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314, 1316 (1974). 
78. 387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.), application for stay 
denied, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974). 
79. 387 F. Supp. at 748. 
80. 510 F.2d at 254. 
81. [d. 
82. 387 F. Supp. at 749·50. 
83. 510 F.2d at 257. Plaintiffs, on October 25, 1974, asked for a preliminary injunction 
restraining the FBI from attending and surveilling the 14th National Convention of the Young 
Socialist Alliance to be held from December 28, 1974 to January I, 1975. Because of the 
shortage of time before that Convention, the matter was adjudicated on an accelerated basis. 
The district court granted an injunction on December 13, 1974. On December 24, 1974, the 
court of appeals vacated that order (except as to certain restrictions on the dissemination of 
information obtained). Plaintiffs then requested a stay of the court of appeals' decision and 
reinstatement of the district court injunction, both of which were denied on December 27, 
1974, by Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Judge. 
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shallow at best and disingenous at worst.84 The Second Circuit twice 
chastised the trial court for proceeding when no "urgency" was pres-
ent,85 and therefore vacated the preliminary injunction.86 
On December 27, 1974, Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit 
judge, heard an emergency application to stay the order of the court 
of appeals and to reinstate the preliminary injunction.87 Justice 
Marshall noted the "unsavory picture of deceit and political sabo-
tage" presented by plaintiffs88 and that "government surveillance 
and infiltration cannot ... be taken lightly," but warned that 
"abhorrence for abuses of governmental investigative authority can-
not be permitted to lead to indiscriminate willingness to enjoin" 
such activities.89 Therefore, the plaintiffs' requested relief was de-
nied,90 and the YSA convention began on December 28, 1974 with 
the FBI surveillance apparatus in tact. The significance of this case, 
aside from its fault of no "urgency," is that Justice Marshall found 
plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to satisfy federal standing require-
84. Even I1ccepting the fact that the Second Circuit had only a few days to prepare its 
opinion, its cavalier acceptance of the applicability of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), was 
feeble, and without any analysis of the differing allegations and evidence in the present case. 
The court simply concluded, "We are not greatly persuaded with respect to the validity of 
these or other asserted distinctions. . . . [T]he FBI's use of the information gathered by it 
from attendance of the YSA conventions seems parallel to that of the Army as described in 
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Laird v. Tatum." 510 F.2d at 256. 
The court borders on the disingenuous not only by its failure to recognize the differences 
between Tatum and the present case, but also because it applies the rule of the majority in 
Tatum to a set of facts analogized to those set out in the Tatum dissent. As is clearly pointed 
out by Judge Winter, dissenting in Donohue v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 202 n.l (4th Cir. 1972), 
another police surveillance case, the majority and dissenting Justices in Tatum had different 
interpretations of the record in that case. 
The court of appeals decision in Socialist Workers Party is also feeble because of its 
limited consideration of the first amendment implications involved. The court's total discus-
sion involved a quotation from Justice Jackson's concurrring and dissenting opinion in Ameri-
can Communications Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950), which, even when written, 
took a severely restrictive view of first amendment rights-more restrictive than the full Court 
has ever taken. The view of the first amendment put forth in the Douds opinion has never 
been applied to clandestine governmental surveillance of, and intrusion into, protected politi-
cal expression. 
85. The Second Circuit first noted that the urgency resulted from the trial judge's 
determination of disputed factual issues, improperly made on the basis of affidavits. 510 F.2d 
at 255. Secondly, the court indicated that it found no urgency requiring the FBI to cease its 
continuing surveillance of the YSA, which, it felt, had not resulted in serious injury in the 
past. [d. at 256. 
86. [d. at 257. Only that portion of the injunction which barred transmission of names 
to the Civil Service Commission was affirmed. 
87. 419 U.S. 1314 (1974). 
88. [d. at 1317. 
89. [d. at 1319. 
90. [d. at 1320. 
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ments. 91 The courthouse door was opened again, but only ever so 
slightly. 
As in Anderson and Tatum, Socialist Workers Party illustrates 
how the basic values or presumptions of a court (in reference to the 
rights-security spectrum) may dictate the resolution of the case. 
The trial court in Socialist Workers Party predicted injury to rights 
of expression if FBI surveillance continued, and, therefore, granted 
the preliminary injunction.92 The court of appeals foresaw serious 
threats to our society, if surveillance is limited, and vacated the 
injunction.93 The tension created by these opinions will be reduced 
only when courts have an "empirical basis on which to make judg-
ments about the necessity, and the danger, of police covert investi-
gative activities directed at lawful political expression."94 It is hoped 
that this Article will provide some of that badly needed empirical 
basis. 
The second case was Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Reli-
gious Society of Friends v. Tate. 95 In this case, a complaint was 
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 187196 against the City of 
Philadelphia police officials for their political surveillance program 
that included photographing and recording attendants at peaceful 
and lawful public assemblies and demonstrations, and maintaining 
dossiers on individuals' political and personal backgrounds.97 The 
suit also challenged the dissemination of gathered information (a) 
to other law enforcement agencies, (b) to private agencies and gov-
ernment agencies with no law enforcement concerns, and (c) on a 
television broadcast in which certain individuals and groups were 
specifically identified as subjects of police information-gathering.98 
The district court, feeling bound by Laird v. Tatum, dismissed 
plaintiffs' complaint as to both the information-gathering and dis-
semination, holding that such activities did not give rise to a 
91. [d. at 1319. The litigation has proceeded, with the most important developments 
revolving around a May 31, 1977 Order by District Judge Griesa that the government release 
to the plaintiffs files on eighteen informers. The propriety of the Order was affirmed by the 
court of appeals, In re United States, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Bell 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 98 S.Ct. 3082 (1978). When Attorney General Griffin Bell failed 
to comply with the Order, he was adjudged in civil contempt. Socialist Workers Party v. 
Attorney General, No. 73-3160 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1978). The Second Circuit stayed the order, 
pending appeal, No. 78·6114 (2d Cir. July 7, 1978) (bench opinion). 
92. 387 F. Supp. at 754. 
93. 510 F.2d at 256. 
94. Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 37 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 634, 640 (1969). 
95. 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975). 
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). 
97. 519 F.2d at 1336. 
98. [d. at 1337. 
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"specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm"-the test of Tatum. 99 The Third Circuit concurred with the 
district court's decision about the information gathering, and dis-
semination of information to "other agencies of government having 
a legitimate law enforcement function."loo The Third Circuit found, 
however, that the other allegations as to the uses and disclosures of 
the gathered information were "sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss,"lol since it concluded, "no safeguards exist on the disposi-
tion of or access to the political and personal information and con-
clusions contained in the dossiers .... "102 The Third Circuit found 
that "since it [was] alleged that plaintiffs [were] subject to sur-
veillance only because their political views deviate[d] from those 
of the· 'establishment'," the allegations showed "immediately 
threatened injury"-such as interference with "job opportunities, 
careers or travel rights."103 It is not clear from the court's opinion, 
however, why these same injuries were not equally threatened by 
the uncontrolled gathering and exchange of information among law 
enforcement agencies. 
The Third Circuit further distinguished between the 
"subjective complaints" of Tatum and plaintiffs' complaint, in 
Tate, of television disclosure, which, "although not concrete, [was] 
nonetheless strikingly apparent."104 The appellate court found that 
this public identification of surveillance subjects, coupled "with the 
absence of a lawful purpose" warranted a grant of standing to the 
Tate plaintiffs. l05 The Third Circuit concluded: 
We are unwilling to say that the Supreme Court in Tatum 
intended to leave our citizens judicially remediless against 
the types of police action discussed. If plaintiffs' allega-
tions are true, this type of activity strikes at the heart of a 
free society. 106 
It appears that, but for the court's feeling that Tatum directly 
controlled intra-police exchange of intelligence, at least portions of 
the allegations would also have been sufficient to warrant standing. 
In Tate, as in Socialist Workers Party, the plaintiffs remained in 
99. 382 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 





105. [d. See also Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff found to have 
standing to seek both expungement of her files and damages against the FBI). 
106. [d. 
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court to determine the merits of the case; standing had been estab-
lished, apparently by the court's approach to the cases from the 
"rights" end of the spectrum. The court in Tate made clear that it 
was "not called upon to express an opinion as to the compatibility 
of such [police] practice with desirable standards under our politi-
cal form of government."107 
The third case, White v. Davis, 108 discussed fully and vigorously 
supported first amendment values in a discrete context of political 
intelligence. In White, a V.C.L.A. professor challenged the Los An-
geles Chief of Police, and others, in a taxpayer's suit "to enjoin the 
alleged illegal expenditure of public funds in connection with the 
police department's conduct of covert intelligence gathering activi-
ties at V.C.L.A."IOU The complaint alleged that secret informers and 
undercover agents had registered as students at V.C.L.A., attended 
classes, and submitted reports of discussions occurring in those 
classes. If 0 It was also alleged that "undercover police agents have 
joined university-recognized organizations, and have made reports 
on discussions at such meetings."1II The materials gathered, the 
complaint stated, "pertain to no illegal activity or acts."112 
The trial court sustained defendants' demurrerll3 and the case, 
like others dealing with police surveillance, was appealled on the 
pleadings. The California Supreme Court clearly indicated its basis 
for reversal of the demurrer. First, the court held that "[t]he alle-
gations of the complaint state a prima facie violation of freedom of 
speech and assembly as well as of the state constitutional right of 
privacy."114 Second, in addressing the issue of standing, the court 
rejected that applicability of Laird v. Tatum,1I5 finding that under 
the California Code of Civil Procedurell6 the use of a taxpayer's suit 
"as a means of challenging the legality of ongoing police investiga-
107. [d. at 1336. 
108. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). 





114. [d. at 760,533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96. 
115. [d. at 763-65,533 P.2d at 226-27,120 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99. The surveillance activities 
at issue in White had been raised previously in the federal court, but dismissed on the same 
narrow doctrine of federal justiciability articulated in Tatum. [d. at 763, 533 P.2d at 226, 120 
Cal. Rptr. at 98. See Bagley v. City of Los Angeles, No. 71-166-JWC (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
116. 13 Cal. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97, quoting CAL. CIV. PRoe. 
CODE § 526 (a) (West 1977): "An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any 
illegal expenditure of ... funds ... of a county, town, city or city and county of the state 
may be maintained against any officer thereof. . . by a citizen resident therein. . . ." [d. 
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tory activities has a long and firmly established heritage in this 
state."lI7 
The California Supreme Court felt that Tatum was decided on 
"a restrictive federal doctrine of justiciability." us In stating the first 
amendment test by which it would measure plaintiff's allegations, 
the court decided that "in light of this potentially grave threat to 
freedom of expression,. . . the government bearS the responsibility 
of demonstrating a compelling state interest which justifies such 
impingement and of showing that its purposes cannot be achieved 
by less restrictive means."UB The California Supreme Court, like the 
trial court in Anderson, placed first amendment values in a 
"preferred position"-a view from the "rights" ~nd of the spectrum, 
requiring (a) a close "nexus" between the government's means and 
ends, (b) a compelling state interest, and (c) the least restrictive 
means to "justify such impingement."12o 
In White, the California Supreme Court's approach from the 
"rights" end of the rights-security spectrum resulted in a skeptical 
view of police surveillance, with the court concluding: "[W]e visu-
alize a substantial probability that this alleged covert police surveil-
lance will chill the exercise of First Amendment rightS."121 The de-
fendants' contention that such activity was to "enable the police to 
anticipate and perhaps prevent future criminal activity"122 did not 
sway the court: 
Although the police unquestionably pursue a legitimate 
interest in gathering information to forestall future crimi-
nal acts, the identification of that legitimate interest is just 
the beginning point of analysis in this case, not, as defen-
dant suggests, the conclusion. The inherent legitimacy of 
the police 'intelligence gathering' functions does not grant 
the police the unbridled power to pursue that function by 
any and all means. In this realm, as in all others, the per-
missible limits of governmental action are circumscribed by 
the Federal Bill of Rights . . . .123 
The court continued with a discussion of first amendment 
117. 13 Cal. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 225-26, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98, citing, Wirin v. 
Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957), and Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 497,193 P.2d 
470 (1948). Both of these cases involved allegedly unconstitutional police practices. 
118. 13 Cal. 3d at 764, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99. 
119. [d. at 761, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 766, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99. 
123. [d. at 766, 533 P.2d 227-28, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100. 
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rights and· values in relation to "ongoing police surveillance of a 
university community," noting that surveillance would "inevitably 
inhibit" free expression by both students and professors, and re-
manded the case for a trial on the merits. 124 . 
The foregoing discussion of judicial consideration of police spy 
litigation reveals two interrelated theories. First, the outcome of 
such lltigation, at least concerning justiciability and standing, is 
dependent upon that end of the rights-security spectrum from 
which the court chooses to approach the matter. Second, the courts 
have not readily accepted plaintiffs' arguments of a "specific pres-
ent objective harm or a threat of specific future harm"125 resulting 
from political surveillance activities. It is hoped that the empirical 
study and analysis which follow will provide a basis upon which to 
determine the "harm" of such surveillance activities, or that it will 
at least show evidence of intelligence-gathering by which the courts 
will be prompted to lean more towards the "rights" end of the 
rights-security spectrum in their initial analysis of police spy litiga-
tion. 
m. STUDY SAMPLE 
A. Obtaining the documents 
In the course of discovery in Benkert v. Michigan State 
Police, 126 a significant quantity of files, documents, and other mate-
rials were obtained from the Detroit Police Department's Recon-
naissance Unit. These materials, relating to ten of the fourteen 
named plaintiffs in Benkert, make up the following study sample. l21 
124. [d. at 772, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
12~. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972). 
126. No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed July 26, 1974). See text 
accompanying notes 8-18 supra. 
127. The ten Benkert plaintiffs, whose Detroit Police Files compose the study sample, 
have each been assigned a letter of the alphabet for easy reference in this article. The assigna-
tion is as follows: Janet Goldwasser (A); Stuart Dowty (B); Bonnie Garvin Lafferty (Cl; 
Selma Goode (D); The Fifth Estate (newspaper) (E); Abdeen Jabara (F); James B. Jacobs 
(G); James T. Lafferty (H); Michigan Assoc. for Consumer Protection (I); and Peter Werbe 
(J). The letters K through Z will be used to refer to those targets whose identity is still 
protected under the Modified Protective Order, infra note 128. 
In this Article, references to specific pages in the Detroit Police Files concerning an 
identified target (e.g., Target E) often are followed by a coded parenthetical indicating the 
part of the target's file in which the information is found (e.g. Detroit Police Files, Target E, 
at 150 (MIC». These codes indicate either the Master Index Card file system (MICl, the 
Intelligence Exchange Card System (IE), or the dossier file system (no parenthetical). The 
term "file," as employed in this Article, includes all index systems, dossiers, and other 
materials in the Detroit Police materials which can be referenced to a particular target (i.e., 
an individual, organization, or event) [hereinafter cited as Detroit Police Files). 
In determining the pagination of a particular target's file, for purposes of this Article, 
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The materials were originally obtained under a strict protective 
order,l28 which was subsequently modified to allow substantial por-
tions of the materials to be used without limitation.129 The limited 
protection still in effect is that the "named plaintiffs ... [may] 
disseminate and use without limitation all information [contained 
in their files] so long as that information does not name or identify 
third parties. . . who have been included in these files and materi-
als as a result of the activities of defendants .... "130 
The purpose of this section is to organize and interpret these 
files and materials in a way that might provide evidence to help 
explain political intelligence gathering; to analyze this evidence to 
determine what presumptions and generaliz~tions made by the 
courts concerning such police activity are justified; and to then pose 
for consideration certain principles and presumptions that should 
govern the resolution of first amendment concerns and dilemmas 
involved in this type of activity. 
A number of research caveats should be noted at the outset. 
First, the plaintiffs were not selected in a random fashion and, 
therefore, are not necessarily statistically representative of all per-
sons and organizations included in the Detroit Police subversive 
files. The plaintiffs are, however, sufficiently representative of all 
surveillance targets to have been certified by the court as proper 
representatives of a class consisting of all persons or organizations 
who have been, are currently being, or will be investigated by the 
subversive units of the Michigan State Police and Detroit Police 
Department. 131 
As a necessary corollary, therefore, the study sample materials 
are not necessarily completely representative of all materials main-
each written side of a sheet of paper or file card is designated as a separate page. Thus, a 
reference to Detroit Police Files, Target E, at 2 (IE), indicates that the cited information will 
be found on the second side of the Intelligence Exchange Card maintained by the Detroit 
Police on Target E. In addition to 747 pages of study sample material disclosed in Benkert, 
many copies of leaflets and other mass-distributed material do not require specific referencing 
and, therefore, are not included in this pagination system. 
It should be noted that the Detroit Police Department has denied maintaining any 
Subversive Unit files on four of the Benkert plaintiffs: Walter Benkert, Sterling Maxfield, 
Lee Gayer, and Cornelius Norwood. At this time it is impossible to ascertain the validity of 
this assertion. 
128. See Protective Order, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ 
(Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., entered orally May 2, 1975). 
129. See Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion for Modification of Pro-
tective Order, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., 
Mich., entered Oct. 10, 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Modified Protective Order]. 
130. [d. 
131. See Order Certifying Class Action, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-
934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Dec. 26, 1975). 
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tained by the police subversive unit. 132 Examination of additional 
files, however, has revealed that the study sample materials are 
typical of those present in most subversive files. There is, therefore, 
some substantial verification that the study sample is representa-
tive of all the Michigan State Police and Detroit Police Department 
subversive files. 
In addition to the study sample materials, other files and docu-
ments, mentioned above, have been examined, but were excluded 
from the study sample because still protected under the court's 
order.l33 Also, the court ordered the city of Detroit defendants to 
disclose all "index cards, file cards, I.E. cards and files pertaining 
to the named plaintiffs. . . and all other files and documents per-
taining to those persons and organizations in [their] possession 
... ,"134 but at least four additional filing systems containing infor-
mation about the Benkert plaintiffs were revealed but not disclosed 
in the course of discovery.135 The materials in those additional filing 
systems are still under the court's protective order, and therefore 
cannot be included in the study sample. 
In addition, there is presently no means of determining whether 
additional filing systems or materials exist, but remain undiscov-
ered. The study sample and analysis is, therefore, only a first effort 
at an in-depth consideration of a limited amount of materials from 
political surveillance files. Nevertheless, it is sufficient material to 
132. In addition to the production under court order of the materials making up the 
study sample, substantial additional discovery, has occurred in the Benkert case. Depositions 
were taken of police officers who are, or were recently, with the Subversive Unit, and thou-
sands of pages contained in files and dossiers on individuals and organizations were examined 
under the Modified Protective Order, supra note 128. 
133. See note 14 supra. The Modified Protective Order, supra note 129, released from 
the original order the files concerning the named plaintiffs in Benkert, but denied plaintiffs' 
motion to also release all materials concerning "consenting third parties." General concepts 
and information that have been developed and obtained as a result of this discovery process 
are inevitably included throughout this Article. 
134. See Order to Produce Documents for Inspection and Copying, Benkert v. Michigan 
State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., entered May 9, 1975). See 
also note 127 supra. 
135. The four additional filing systems that have been isolated are designated by the 
city as: (1) the picture or photograph file, which may also include videotapes and motion 
pictures, and has been admitted to exist; (2) the demonstration file, which is apparently a 
chronological indexing and recording of all public demonstrations that have occurred in the 
city, as well as a number of other "events" that the police determine merit surveillance, many 
of which have involved the primary targets; (3) the source file, which is apparently a filing 
systerh in which the original reports or written information submitted by all informants and 
undercover agents concerning individuals and' organizations are kept according to a coded 
numerical informant or undercover agent designation; and (4) the surveillance file, which is 
a chronological file of logs turned in by police officers of the Subversive Unit assigned to 
surveillance duty, which may involve a stationary or a moving surveillance of a particular 
individual, location, or event. 
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provide significant insights into the nature of police political spying 
apparatus. Although the study sample embraces only subversive 
files from the Detroit Police Department, there is evidence to be-
lieve that many local subversive units operate in similar ways.136 
The few writings available on police intelligence units, and the var-
ious techniques they employ, seem to reveal a basic outline or pro-
gram similar to that pursued by the Detroit Police Department-at 
least from 1963 to 1974, which is the time span covered by the study 
sample. '37 This provides further support for the value of the study 
sample analysis beyond the locale out of which it arose. 
B. Physical Description 
The compilation of materials which constitute a target's "file" 
has three categories, each of which is apparently maintained in a 
physically separate filing system. l38 The three categories or types of 
material are: Master Index Cards, Intelligence Evaluation or Intel-
ligence Exchange Cards (I.E. Cards), and Dossiers. Including all 
these types of documents, the study sample contained a total of 747 
pages, 116 pages of Master Index Cards, 26 pages of I.E. Cards, and 
605 pages of dossier material. In addition, the dossiers contained a 
significant number of publicly distributed documents, which were 
not counted as pages of the study sample. '39 
1. Master Index Cards 
The Master Index Card, a conventional four-by-six card, ap-
pears to form the basis of the primary name filing system. In some 
instances, these cards have had certain information categories 
printed on them. Often a target will have more than one Index Card 
in the set of cards relating to it, in which case the cards are consecu-
tively numbered. Some files contain two separate sets of Index 
Cards, apparently due to the fact that the Detroit Police had two 
136. Discovery in Benkert revealed numerous references to similar material contained 
in, or received from, local law enforcement agencies in Michigan, and some references to out-
of-state police departments as sources of information gathered by the Michigan State Police. 
137. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE Ac-
TIVmES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Congo 2d Sess. (1976); 
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE IRON FIsT AND THE VELVET GLOVE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE U.S. POLICE (2d ed. 1977); A. BOUZA, POLICE INTELLIGENCE: THE OPERATIONS OF AN 
INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (1976). 
138. See Detroit Police Files, supra note 127. 
139. Most of these additional documents are leaflets, brochures, and other handouts 
publicly distributed by various political organizations. In addition, the files contained entire 
copies of many newspapers of political organizations and papers characterized as 
"underground" or "alternative press." For example, target E, supra note 127, was a newspa-
per, and its file included almost a complete set of the paper for the past few years. 
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separate details engaged in political intelligence gathering during 
the late 1960's.l40 
The face card in a Master Index Card set contains primarily 
personal or organization information, and subsequent cards in a set 
contain activity entries. 141 Changes in personal informa-
tion-particularly address, phone number, and employment-are 
regularly entered on the cards, but the main purpose of the Master 
Index set seems to be exactly as its name implies-a master index 
to all activities of a target individual or organization, with refer-
ences to where more-detailed information can be found. 
2. Intelligence Exchange Cards 
The Intelligence Exchange (I.E.) Card is another summary 
index of a target's history and activities. These cards are approxi-
mately eight and one-half by ten inches, with a fold in the middle 
for filing. One or more photographs are often included on the 
cards. 142 
The entries on the I.E. Cards are similar in nature to and some-
times duplicate the entries on the Master Index Cards. As with the 
Master Index Cards, an individual or organization has often had two 
or more I.E. Cards in a set, which would be numbered consecutively 
and stapled together. 
The I.E. Cards are apparently a newer index form used by one 
of the two subversive units of the Detroit Police whenever a target 
appeared more than a few times in the subversive files. When the 
two units merged in 1970, the I.E. Cards were retained. 143 
Chart No.1 indicates the number of Master Index (MIC) and 
I.E. Card (IE) pages for the 10 targets of the study sample. 
140. See Detroit News, Sept. 4, 1975, at lA, col. 2. In the 1930's, the Detroit Police 
created a "subversive detail." After the 1967 Detroit riots, a second unit, the "security 
detail," was created to surveil political protest groups. See also L. Loukopoulos, The Detroit 
Police Department: A Research for the Committee on Public Awareness (May 1970) (unpub· 
lished report in Wayne St. Univ. L. Sch. Lib.). Depositions of police officers in Benkert 
confirmed the existence of these two separate units, but any further discussion is precluded 
by the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129. 
141. See Note 156 & accompanying text infra. 
142. A detailed exploration of the photographing, videotaping, and filming activities of 
the Subversive Unit is beyond the scope of this Article, since these materials were not in· 
cluded in the study sample. It is interesting to note, however, that many of the targets of the 
Police files have never been arrested or otherwise subjected to known police photography. It 
appears, therefore, that the Detroit Police obtain photographs surreptitiously from a variety 
of sources. For example, Abdeen Jabara, target F, indicated in an interview with the author, 
on June 1, 1975, that the two photographs included in his file were (1) a photograph furnished 
to a local bar association for an attorney registry and (2) a photograph submitted for passport 
renewal some years ago. 
143. See Deposition of Stanley Perich, at 7, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74· 
023·934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Michigan., taken Nov. 18, 1975). 
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Target A B C D E F G H 
MIC 13 18 25 2 16 no 7 2 
(MIC) 
IE 5 4 1 2 223 3 


















The third type of documentary compilation in the study sample 
is the dossier; one or more eight-by-eleven-inch folders labelled with 
a designation of the target individual or organization by name, code 
number, or both. The primary police-prepared documents con-
tained in a dossier are called "Detroit Police Department Inter-
Office Memorandum."144 These vary in length-the longest in the 
study sample containing ten pages-and are always signed by at 
least one, and often two, police officers and a police supervisor who 
has "read and approved" the report.145 . 
The dossiers also contain appropriately labelled and dated orig-
inals or copies of newspaper and magazine clippings, including let-
ters to the editor!46 In addition, the dossiers contained a variety of 
additional documents printed or distributed by the target or some-
one associated therewith, including: publicly distributed litera-
ture;147 leaflets;148 and organizational position papers Jintended for 
limited private distribution such as agendas, rosters, and treasurers' 
reports. 149 The dossiers also contained various documents from other 
government agencies-law enforcement and otherwise-which re-
late to the target, an associate or relative thereof, or an organization 
to which one of those individuals allegedly belonged.150 A number of 
144. City of Detroit Forms D-77-ME and DPD 568 (12-63). 
145. A sample of this document, and the accompanying signatures, is contained in 
Appendix C of this Article. 
146. See text accompanying notes 195-200 infra. 
147. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target E, at 164 (underground 
newspaper) & Target C, at 131 (mass mailing). 
148. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 171 (leaflet announcing anti-war demonstration). 
149. See, e.g., id. Target C, at 51, 59 (invitations to organizational meetings) 70 (inter-
nal proposal). . 
150. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 197, 203 (articles of incorporation and annual ~eport of 
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organizational mailing and membership lists, usually provided by 
a "confidential source," were also found in the dossiers of the study 
sample. 151 
The majority of pages constituting the study sample were from 
non public sources, since publicly distributed leaflets, newspapers, 
and other documents were excluded from the study sample pagina-
tion. 152 The Master Index and I.E. cards, none of which is from 
public sources, account for 141 pages of the study sample. The bulk 
of the remaining 606 pages of the study sample were documents 
prepared by police officers and other government agencies, or by the 
surveillance targets for private use. For example, there were fifty-
seven different police memoranda in the dossiers of the study sam-
pIe, one dossier containing twenty-two such memoranda. 
Other police-prepared documents in the dossiers include tele-
type requests for information on the targets, often accompanied by 
a teletype response. 153 Documents prepared or furnished by other 
police departments or other government agencies also appeared in 
the dossiers. In some instances, the Detroit Police Department 
Memoranda, the basic police-prepared document in the dossiers, 154 
specifically indicated that the Michigan State Police supplied or 
participated in gathering the information entered.155 
C. Typical Examples of Information Gathered 
1. Introduction 
An examination of some representative examples of the infor-
mation contained in the various types of documents in the study 
sample illustrates the range of activity and concerns recorded by the 
police department, and the techniques employed to gather that in-
formation. 
As noted earlier in Chart No.1, there were 116 pages (or sides) 
of Master Index Cards and 25 pages of I.E. Cards, each containing 
entries of a similar nature. In most cases, the face card (Master 
Index or I.E.) included the following information: name; aliases; 
nonprofit corporation); Target J, at 364-71 (application for permit to carry a concealed 
weapon), 426 (marriage license). 
151. See, e.g., id. Target at 204 (first page of 24-pagemailinglist);TargetC.at 94 
("contact list" of political organization). 
152. As discussed earlier, Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, the Master Index and 
Intelligence Exchange Cards are included in the sample study pages. See also note 138 & 
accompanying text, supra. 
153. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127; Target J, at 363; Target C, at 142. 
154. Full reports from the Michigan State Police, FBI and other state and local police 
agencies appear frequently in a number of files examined, but are not included in the study 
sample because they are still under the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129. 
155. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 98, 109. 
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former and present home and business addresses and phone num-
bers; date of birth; brief physical description; automobile license 
and registration information; employment information; family in-
formation; FBI number (if one existed); and similar identifying, 
locating, and historical information. 156 The cards following the face 
card in a given Master Index or I.E. card set included very little of 
this basic information, including only name and activity or surveil-
lance entries. Often, the face cards also contained activity or sur-
veillance entries, but there is only room for a few such entries under 
the basic information entered. As can be seen in Chart No.2, in the 
study sample there were 329 activity entries on the Master Index 
Cards, and 258 such entries on the I.E. Cards. 157 The number of 
entries on a single Master Index Card ranged from 0 to 122, while 
the entries on a single I.E. Card ranged from 0 to 67. The study 
sample contained relatively few instances where activity entries 
were duplicated between the two index card systems. 
Target 
A B C 
?rIIC 17 34 87 
IE 38 67 4 
Total 56 105 97 
D E F G H I 
Total 
J Entries 
4 30 no 24 8 3 122 329 
?rIIC 
4 13 9 25 40 no 58 258 
IE 
9 43 9 49 48 3 180 587 
CHART NO.2 
The examination of the study sample materials will proceed by 
identifying certain basic categories of information gathered, and 
then provide examples of the entries followed by explanatory com-
ments. 
2. Personal History Items 
1. 1958 subj. graduated from Mumford High sch. Former 
add: -Mifflin Avenue., Lansing, Mich. 158 
2. 1963, Sept., subj. registered for the Fall Semester at 
Wayne State University Liberal Art Student. 159 
156. See Appendices A and B. 
157. See note 157 & accompanying text supra. 
158. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 338 (MIC). 
159. [d. 
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3. July 10, 1967, Mr. K. called above phone number and 
learned that J and his wife reside at the above address. A 
female who identified herself as SUE answered the phone 
and indicated that she was J's sister.160 
4. 3-5-70 Checking Bressers, subj. gave same address and 
phone number at-Coplin as a X same address, Also Det. 
Edison has subject still living at-Coplin. 161 
5. 9-6-72 subj. now lives at -York, -Twps, with his wife 
M, W, X, Y, and Z per 142.162 
6. 3-6-74 Subj. was divorced from his wife P. Subj. was 
Plaintiff case No: 73 _.163 
7. 1974 Subj. is suppose [sic] to be married to C per 
source info. 164 
The form of the above entries-a date followed by short 
phrases-is typical of almost all the Master Index and I.E. Card 
entries. In some instances, however, there were long single-spaced 
entries covering as much as three index cards.165 The index card 
entries are never signed or initialed, and therefore there is no means 
of identifying, from the cards alone, who in the police department 
made or authorized the entry. In some instances the entries refer, 
or correspond, to one or more documents in the dossier of the target 
or of another subject. In other cases, however, the items on the 
Master Index and I.E. Cards appear to stand alone. 
In terms of content, the first set of entries on all the Master 
Index and I.E. Cards, or on the face card of a set of cards, contain 
a substantial amount of personal history information which, if 
needed, is updated by chronological data entries, rather than by 
amending the original entries. As with all entries on the index cards, 
only occasionally has a source been referenced. In entry 5, for exam-
ple, "per 142" is a reference to a police informant, undercover agent, 
or confidential source of the information entered, whose code desig-
nation is "142." In entry 4, Detroit Edison obviously provided some 
information. The use of elaborate source referencing is clearly indi-
cated by other entries on documents in the study sample and will 
160. [d. 350 (MIC). 
161. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE), 263 (MIC). 
162. [d., Target J, at 330 (IE). The reference "per 142" in this item indicates the 
informant or undercover agent who provided the entered data. 
163. [d. Target H, at 251 (IE). 
164. [d. 
165. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 157; Target G, at 259 (containing summaries of newspa-
per articles concerning the target or an organization with which the target associates). See 
also id. Target E, at 147-48 (lengthy entry of a list identifying individuals on underground 
newspaper editorial staff). 
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be fully explored in a subsequent section of this Article which deals 
with cross-referencing. 
3. Employment 
8. 1967, employed as ass't instructor, Department of Pol-
itical Science, MSU, East Lansing, Michigan.166 
9. 10-20-70 Issue of [community college paper] states 
that subject has been fired from his teaching job at MCCC 
[Macomb County Community College).167 
10. 1971 Subj. reported to be a part-time employee at 
Main Library. 168 
11. 11-13-71 Surv. Crew Obs subj's wife pick him up at 
work and then go to-Cass [food market], and from there 
they drove to-Grand River. 169 
12. 3-9-72 Subj. resigned from Warren Truck Plant.17° 
13. 10-28-72 Subj. has a talk show (RADIO) called 
NIGHT CALL, Station WRIF, 101. FM, 3:30-4:30 A.M., 
Phone number 345- WRIF. Guest speaker this night was 
[X]. Subjs. talked about [3 political organizations].171 
14. 6-73 Secretary at WCCC [Wayne County Community 
College] .172 
15. 7-9-73 Subj. now works as a news broadcaster for 
WPON, a radio station in Pontiac. 173 
16. Works for Florist Trans-World Delivery,-Lafayette 
St.174 
17. 10-1-73 From source 142 subj. resides at-Gratiot, Mt. 
Clemens. Also subj. was fired from newspaper for a radical 
article. Believe he no longer teaches.175 
Most of the.files in the study sample contain employment en-
tries. Often more than one is included as a target changes employ-
ment. These employment entries are often joined with other per-
sonal history information, although sometimes they are alone. 
Historically, there is no question that the accumulation of pol-
itical intelligence information concerning citizens was primarily for 
166. [d. Target B, at 215 (MIC). 
167. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE). 
168. [d. Target C, at 5 (MIC). 
169. [d. Target B, at 208 (IE). 
170. [d. 
171. [d. Target A, at 231 (IE). 
172. [d. Target C, at 21 (MIC). 
173. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE). 
174. [d. Target J, at 330 (IE). 
175. [d. Target A, at 231 (IE). 
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the purpose of monitoring and influencing employmentl76 and that 
the intended effect was the denial or termination of employment of 
"subversives." In 1950, when the Michigan Legislature authorized 
the Commissioner of the Michgan State Police to create a Subver-
sive Activities Investigation Division,177 the release of any confiden-
tial information accumulated by that unit on matters "subversive 
of government" was made a felony, but it was specifically provided 
"that the commissioner may furnish information. . . to responsible 
heads of any agency having charge of employment by the 
state .... "17S Additionally, the Communist Control Act, or 
"Trucks Act," was adopted by the Michigan Legislature in 1952,179 
following other states which had mimicked the federal communist-
control legislation passed in 1950. This act was also concerned with 
the employment of alleged "subversives." Hence, the Michigan 
State Police became very active in surveillance of political activity 
during the 1950's. ISO 
Although most provisions of the Trucks Act were declared in-
valid by virtue of the federal preemption in Albertson v. Attorney 
General, lSI still in effect was the section providing that: 
No person may hold any non-elected position, job or office 
for the State of Michigan, or any political subdivision 
thereof ... where reasonable grounds exist, on all the evi-
dence, from which . . . the employer or superior of such 
person can say with reasonable certainty that such person 
176. For a discussion of Detroit politics, see J. GREENSTONE, LABOR IN AMERICAN 
POUTICS, 110-31 (1969). See generally, J. JENSEN, THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE (1968); A. NEVINS, 
FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY (1954). 
177. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 28.51-28.56 (1970). 
178. Id. § 28.53. 
179. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 752.321-757.332 (1970). 
180. 1953 Michigan State Police Report, at 42. See also 1959 Michigan State Police 
Report; Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK REV. 
OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 27. Mr. Donner quotes at length from the 1969 Annual Report of 
the Massachusuetts State Police Division of Subversive Activity, wherein it is indicated that 
along with a wide range of governmental agencies, "industrial plants and educational institu-
tions now clear with this division on security checks." Id. 
181. 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956). Albertson declared sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 
of the Michigan Communist Control Law, MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 752.321-32 (1970) (The 
Trucks Act), preempted by federal legislation and, therefore, unenforceable. Sections 1, 6, 
and 8 of the law were not challenged in that case and, therefore, were left unaffected. 
Albertson was decided six weeks after the United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania V. 
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), declared certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act 
superceded by federal legislation. In Albertson V. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 
1952), an earlier attempt to have the Trucks Act declared unconstitutonal was unsuccessful. 
See also Comment, The Present Status of Michigan Anti-Subversion Legislation, 2 WAYNE 
L. REv. 221 (1956). 
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is a Communist or a knowing member of a Communist front 
organization. 182 
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The Michigan State Police and other police departments were still 
concerned with efforts to infiltrate the educational field, defense 
plants, labor, civic, state, and other organizations, and continued 
their surveillance of political activity.183 It now appears, however, 
that concern with "subversives" extended far beyond the statutory 
mandate concerning governmental employment. 
4. Accumulation of Names 
18. The following were recognized as taking part in the 
anti-war Sing Along Demonstration: [26 names]. Also 
present was [X's] mother, name unknown.184 
19. The following were recognized as being in attendance 
at this meeting: [list of names] .185 
20. The following is a registration of vehicles observed in 
the immediate area of the meeting: [list of automobiles 
including license number, year and make, followed by 
names and addresses, purported the registered owners of 
the vehicle].186 
It is apparent now that the primary concern of political infor-
mation gathering is the listing of names of all persons possibly in-
volved or associated with any target or activity that is under surveil-
lance. Within the study sample, this effort to associate as many 
individuals as possible with as many organizations and occurences 
as possible has resulted in specific references, by name, to over 150 
different organizations.187 As revealed by the documents in the study 
sample, a person's name may appear in a list of the subversive unit 
in a number of ways. First, various organizations and their meetings 
were regularly monitored. At the conclusion of the reports of these 
meetings appeared a list of persons identified as being in atten-
dance. 188 Second, certain events or activities, chosen by police be-
182. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 752.328 (1970). 
183. 1956 Michigan State Police Report. 
184. Detroit Police Files, supra note 126, Target C, at 25. 
185. Forty of the fifty-seven police reports in the study sample contained such atten-
dance lists, with three to sixty-five entries included therein. 
186. Twenty of the fifty-seven police reports in the study sample included such license 
plate lists. The lists ranged from three to eighty-one entries. 
187. Because the organizations referred to in the study sample are often indicated by 
initials, many sets being similar and, therefore, confusing, it is impossible to determine the 
exact number of organizations reported in the study sample, without conducting extensive 
interviews and investigations, which is beyond the scope of this Article. The estimate of 150 
is conservative. 
188. The dossiers of the primary targets contained many police reports focusing on 
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cause of their political nature or sponsor, were monitored. In the 
case of public demonstrations or events, subversive unit officers, or 
their informers, would be in attendance and file reports-again, 
with a list of persons identified at the 'event. These lists included 
the names of individuals in attendance, regardless of whether they 
were members of the sponsoring organization of an event that would 
otherwise have prompted the subversive unit's surveillance. IH9 
A third means of gathering names was by observing vehicles in 
various locations, or in the vicinity of various activities, and record-
ing and checking the registrations of the vehicles observed. Organi-
zational offices, meeting places, functions, and persons' homes were 
the primary focus for this type of police activity. On a few occasions 
the police reports indicated that police actually observed the named 
individual leaving the observed vehicle,19o but in most cases, it is 
clear that the names listed were merely the result of obtaining regis-
tration information. 191 In this way, persons not at a monitored event 
would have their name appear in subversive unit reports if their 
vehicle was parked in the vicinity of an event or activity under 
surveillance. Persons attending merely as observers, and not partici-
pants, were named on a police list, without distinction. 
Often, names of persons were also obtained by the subversive 
unit from leaflets or other publically distributed documents of an 
organization or of organizers of an event under surveillance. 192 The 
names of announced speakers at such events were listed by police, 
regardless of whether the speaker actually appeared. 193 Thus, errors 
in preparation of leaflets or event agendas, and changes in plans 
were often unrecognized in the police lists. Names were also listed 
in the subversive files if they appeared in any periodical or newspa-
per issued by political dissenters. Indeed, detailed files were main-
tained on dissenting periodicals-one of which became a plaintiff in 
Benkert. 194 Another prevalent police practice appearing in the files 
particular meetings or activities of certain organizations, and contained therewith a list of 
individuals in attendance. 
189. For example, one's name might be discovered on lists entitled: Identification of 
Persons Taking Part in Anti-War Demonstration at the Federal Building, Sponsored by 
[name of organization or individual]; or Anti-War and Free Angela Davis March and Rally. 
190. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 100. "This subject was 
observed driving the vehicle with Minnesota license plates listed below. X was observed being 
transported in this vehicle. . . ." [d. 
19!. See, e.g., id. Target J, at 378. This report states: "[T]he following is a registration 
of vehicles parked in the immediate area of police headquarters. Occupants took part in the 
demonstration." [d. 
192. See note 139 supra. 
193. Interviews with Targets A, B, F, H, and J, Detroit Police Files supra note 127, 
conducted May 1975. 
194. Target E, supra note 127, is such a newspaper. See note 139 supra. 
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of the study sample was the inclusion in the dossiers of letters to the 
editor and other articles from major metropolitan newspapers. The 
letters and articles collected were those expressing views critical of 
government policy, but never dealing with proposed action. For 
example: 
21. The U. S. walkout on the Paris peace talks proves once 
again that Nixon has no intention of ending U. S. involve-
ment in Southeast Asia. During the entire time we were 
supposedly negotiating a settlement, 100 tons of bombs 
were dropped each hour on the Indochinese people. By the 
end of this month, the U. S. will have dropped as many 
bombs on Vietnam as were dropped in all of 1971. 
Our representative, William Porter, says that the U.S. 'Yill 
not return to the talks until the Vietnamese decide to nego-
tiate "seriously". But if we were serious, we would not even 
be there. We have nothing to negotiate; we need only to 
withdraw all troops and material from Indochina now. That 
is the only serious way to end the war. 
[Target C and another]195 
22. When Tricky Dick tells us the cure for the imbalance 
of dollars will balance out with the surtax on all foreign 
goods, we are again being led deeper into disaster. When 
the foreign countries are forced to do the same to our goods, 
what has the world got but a depression that will make the 
30's look like fun? 
What we should realize is the cost of Vietnam alone with 
the cost of maintaining an Army all over the world is what 
is leaving our money there instead of here. The answer is 
to cut back on the military and end the war now. 
X [Mother of Target Cp96 
23. To the small businessman: Aren't you offended when 
Mr. Connolly appears on TV and states "interest rates 
don't have to be frozen, they're at an all time low"? Bank 
interest rates are at 9V2% Either he thinks the public is a 
pack of idiots or he is. 
X [Mother of Target C] 197 
Other examples, too lengthy to present here, are headlines: 
195. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 49. 
196. Id.83. 
197. ld. 84. 
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"Bombing Violence Compared";198 "Wallace, A Racist Demagog"; 199 
and "Failure to Represent, "200 criticizing a Michigan State Senator. 
N ames also appeared in the police files through police examina-
tion of other government files in which names are listed for nonpo-
lice purposes. For example, articles of incorporation, assumed name 
files, bar association records, applications of various sorts, occupa-
tional licensing files, and the like, appear to have provided names 
for the subversive unit. In checking an individual or organization 
whose name has come to police attention, the police examination of 
public documents has often resulted in the names of people asso-
ciated with the target being included in the police report. For exam-
ple, stockholders appearing on corporate papers filed with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury; 201 parents, parties, and attendants at wed-
dings whose names appear on a marriage license;202 and references 
acknowledged on gun permits,203 may find their names, and possibly 
their own dossiers, in the police subversive files. 
5. Organizational Lists 
24. April 1967 Subj. listed as member of the [political 
organization]. From Extremely Confidential Source.204 
25. 1968, File 3396, RADICALS IN PROFESSIONS 
CONFERENCE, is alleged to have taken place. See file for 
confidential list obtained from 009, people who attended, 
listed according to interest. (It appears to be a list ofProfes-
sions engaged in the radicalleft.)205 
26. Oct. 1970, file 509. Subj. name appears on confidential 
198. Id. 38. This letter, in the Detroit News on May 15, 1972, challenged the editorial 
position opposing student disorder on campuses while supporting "indiscriminate terror 
bombing" in Vietnam. 
199. Id. Target C, at 44. This letter was included in the target's file even though it was 
written by the target's father. 
200.. Id. 96. This letter criticized a senator for his position on the Vietnam war, and 
was included in the target's file even though it was written by the target's father. 
201. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 197, 203 (articles of incorporation and annual report of 
nonprofit corporation). The Detroit Police Department and Michigan State Police have reo 
leased such information to Congressional Committees. See, e.g., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE 
SUB,COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE EXTENT OF SUBVERSION IN THE NEW LEFT, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
part 8 at 1118·25, 1127-28, and part 9 at 1227-31, 1243-44 (1971). 
202. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 426. In this instance, 
the names of J's parents, the witnesses, and the rabbi at the wedding were included with a 
copy of the marriage license in an entry on J's Master Index Card. 
203. See, e.g., id. Target J, at 364-72. 
204. Id. Target B, at 217. 
205. Id. 213, 220; Target A, at 247. Source 009 is a police informant. 
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[political organization newspaper] MAILING LIST per 
009.206 
27. July 1971, See File 1692, confidential phone list put 
out by the local chapter of the [political organization]. 
This in reality is a ... membership list. Subj. first name, 
last initial and phone number appears on same.207 
28. [twenty-five page alphabetical mailing list)208 
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'One means of gathering a large number of names, and appar-
ently also an end in itself, is the collection of confidential organiza-
tionallists which have been prepared by a group solely for its inter-
nal use. This includes mailing and phone lists and contributor re-
cords as well as membership lists. While some of these lists have 
been made public, most are closely guarded and can be obtained 
only by stealth, misrepresentation, or compulsion. 
In the examples given above, police comment itself indicates 
that in four instances the material gathered was considered 
"confidential" or was supplied by a "confidential source." In three 
of the four instances, a covert police agent was responsible for ob-
taining the list. The fifth item, 28, has no indication as to how the 
police obtained it for filing in the target's dossier. It is noted, how-
ever, that of the four different confidential sources who provided 
information concerning target E, the contact in 1972 was source 009. 
This is the same confidential source who provided the confidential 
lists in items 25 and 26, and tends to corroborate their acquisition 
by misappropriation through misrepresentation (e.g., a covert agent 
obtaining access for alleged organizational reasons), or through 
stealth (e.g., theft, false arrest, or reproduction without authoriza-
tion). 
The two lists referred to in items 27 and 28 contain 79 and 170 
names, respectively. It is apparent that the gathering of a fair num-
ber of lists, like those in the examples above, will quickly flesh out 
the files of a spy unit. It is not yet certain, however, whether each 
person or organization whose name appears in a police report-by 
virtue of affiliation with a surveilled individual, organization, or 
event-ultimately finds that he, she, or it has a personal police file. 
The study sample material does not reveal whether the police sub-
versive unit operates a selection process whereby some names 
merely remain on acquired lists, and other names result in new files 
being opened. A number of Master Index Cards in the study sample 
206. [d. Target C, at 10. 
207. [d. 12. A copy of the list referred to also appears on page 94 of Target C's file. 
208. [d. Target E, at 204. 
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do suggest that a file may be opened solely on the basis of a name's 
appearance on a list, since some Master Index Cards contained only 
a single entry noting the target's attendance at an event, or the 
target's membership in an organization. The use of lists in the sub-
versive files also provides a ready method of cross-referencing per-
sons among organizations and associates, without laboriously sur-
veilling all events which may occur. 
6. Cross-Referencing 
It is clear from the study sample materials that information on 
a given individual or organization may exist in anywhere from two 
to dozens of files,209 and an examination of the study sample would 
be incomplete without a discussion of the elaborate cross-references. 
a. Specific Cross-Referencing 
In the study sample, there were specific cross-references to 
fifty-nine files maintained under names or code numbers different 
from those of the ten targets in the sample. As noted earlier, individ-
uals or organizations had files designated by name, code number, 
or both. Specific cross-referencing is the cross-referencing of infor-
mation to another file by specific name or number. A few examples 
are: 
29. 10-5-70 Attended meeting at -Harper, DCEWN. See 
rpt. dtd 10-7-70 in DCEWN file [anti-war group}. 210 
30. Oct. 1970, file 509. Subj. name appears on confidential 
[political organization newspaper] MAILING LIST per 
009.211 
31. 5-8-71, File 1869. Report on steering committee meet-
ing of X COALITION, held at Washington, D.C. Subj At-
tended.212 
32. 10-16-71 Subj. took part in demonstration at DeHoCo 
[Detroit House of Correction]. See [political organiza-
tion] file.213 
209. Computerization could certainly be an effective means of maintaining and compil-
ing the information gathered by a subversive unit, and would enhance the cross-referencing 
system apparent in the study sample. Whether the Detroit Police Department and the Michi-
gan State Police have computerized their subversive file systems remains an unanswered 
question. Considering the magnitude of information gathered and the number of targets 
surveilled and cross-referenced, the likelihood of computerized file systems should not be 
discounteq. 
210. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C at 1 (MIC). 
211. [d. 10 (MIC). 
212. [d. 8 (MIC). 
213. [d. Target J, at 330 (IE). 
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33. 8-25-72 Det. News art. in file 3308 ... Subj. V, W, X, 
Y and Z cosigned a letter to the Editor complaining of the 
"harrassment" that their respective groups encountered in 
and at a recent AIR WAR HEARING held at the City 
County Building. See report of 8-14-72, C-File. 214 
34. 6-5-73 File 2756, Subj. was identified at this meeting 
of the [Detroit political organization] held this date at the 
Central Methodist Church.215 
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The total number of-specific cross-references in the study sam-
ple was 189; as many as 26 were in a single file. Given that some of 
the references were to the same files, the ten targets in the study 
sample would be obliged to examine a minimum of fifty-nine addi-
tional files to find all information concerning themselves. And, if 
those fifty-nine files are similar to those of the study sample, an 
examination of those files will necessitate another geometric jump 
in order to fully explore the total amount of information which may 
be contained on a single target in the Detroit Police subversive files. 
Indeed, the cross-referencing is so extensive that it is impossible to 
determine whether one possesses all information concerning a given 
target, particularly an organization, without examining all the files 
maintained by the subversive unit. 
There are other compilations of material maintained by the 
Detroit Police to which study sample items are specifically cross-
referenced, but which were not included in the list of fifty-nine other 
files because they appear to be of a different nature-supplemental 
filing systems. There is independent verification of the existence of 
at least two such supplemental systems.216 For example, numerous 
items in the study sample were cross-referenced to the 
"demonstration file" and numerous items referred to the "photo 
file," indicating that there was information contained in those other 
filing systems concerning an event, meeting, individual, or organi-
zation.217 
For many events and demonstrations scheduled to occur in the 
city of Detroit, at least two reports were prepared by the Detroit 
Police to be filed in the demonstration file-aside from event entries 
214. [d. Target C, at 19 (MIC). 
215. [d. Target B, at 227 (MIC). 
216. Discovery in Benkert revealed portions of the Detroit Police "demonstration file" 
and "photo file." These materials are not included in the study sample, and are not available 
for further discussion because of the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129. See also note 
135 supra. 
217. The names of these files have varied over the years; the "demonstration file" was 
apparently known as the "chrono file" and the "photo file" was once the "pict. file." Detroit 
Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 207. 
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in target files. These reports are supplemental to the Detroit Police 
Department Memorandum reports of demonstrations which fre-
quently appear in the dossiers of the study sample. The supplemen-
tal demonstration file contains (1) pre-demonstration documents, 
which provide notification of pending demonstrations to the police 
and other agencies, and (2) post-demonstration reports, indicating 
the time, place, and details of demonstrations. 
In addition, the Detroit Police have photographed numerous 
individuals at various events and demonstrations, sometimes col-
lecting hundreds of photographs of a single event. Of the police 
photographs examined in the study sample, a large number ap-
peared to be concerned with isolating one or a small group of per-
sons-probably for purposes of identification. The photographs were 
general, long-range shots of a demonstration or meeting in progress, 
tables distributing literature, or the wording of various signs carried 
by demonstrators. Most of the photos examined related to events 
open to the public, although it is impossible to determine from the 
study sample whether nonpublic events were also photographed. 
The photo file, and references thereto, made no indication as to the 
uses of the gathered photographs, or as to whether copies of them 
had ever been disseminated or used in any fashion. 
b. Nonspecific Cross-Referencing 
The use of nonspecific cross-referencing, in the study sample 
and other subversive files, presents a problem even more complex 
than that of the specific cross-referencing systems. It appears that, 
in some instances, a large amount of information concerning a tar-
get is contained in a file that is not mentioned by name (or number) 
in the target's file. Some examples will indicate how this conclusion 
was reached, and show the wide variety of entries used for nonspe-
cific cross-referencing: 
35. 5-1-69 Subj. took part in a Black Panther rally at the 
Detroit Federal Building to free Huey Newton.218 
While there is no specific reference in this item to any file concern-
r 
ing the Black Panther Party, the entry resulted from surveillance 
of a Black Panther event. For clarity, consider the following entry 
that preceded item 35 in the target's file: 
36. 10-18-68 Sur. obs. X at WSU [Wayne State Univer-
sity] Black Panther Meeting, Eldridge Cleaver is a sched-
uled speaker. 219 
218. [d. Target J, at 329 (IE). 
219. [d. 
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It is interesting to note that the target in whose file the above entries 
are contained is a white male who at no time was a member of the 
Black Panther Party. The cross-referencing becomes more apparent 
in the next entry, which preceded item 36: 
37. 8-17-68 Sur. obs. [license number of target's vehicle] 
vicinity of Michigan Union Building, Ann Arbor. See Black 
Panther file. 220 
While there is no specific cross-reference to items 35 and 36, unlike 
item 37, the question is raised whether there is information concern-
ing items 35 and 36 in the Black Panther Party file. Unfortunately, 
this question cannot be answered solely on the basis of information 
contained in the study sample. 
Another type of nonspecific cross-referencing results when the 
subversive unit deploys "surveillance crews." Many files frequently 
referred to "surveillance crews," in cars or otherwise, observing cer-
tain addresses and actually following specific individuals around 
the city or state. The resulting eIitries are quite similar: 
38. 12-29-70 Subj. car obs. by sur. crew pk. vic. 
of---John Lodge.221 
39. 5-8-73 Subj. Obs. at U. S. Post Office at Greenfield 
and Longfellow, Dearborn.222 
40. 6-1-73 Surv. Obs. subj. and unk. w/f into [sic] the 
McKenny Union at EMU, Ypsilanti [Eastern Michigan 
University], later followed to apt. complex at---Rose, 
Ann Arbor .223 
It is not clear from these entries whether there is information 
concerning the targets, or related to these entries, in other files of 
the subversive unit. Two factors, however, suggest that such further 
information may be found: first, no report or document in the tar-
get's file made any references to the information and surveillance 
noted in the surveillance crew entries for that target, and no report 
or other information dated on or near the date of the crew entry 
appeared ·in the target's file. The surveillance crew entry must, 
therefore, have come from information not contained in the target's 
file, but maintained elsewhere. Second, documents entitled 
"surveillance reports" were observed in a target organization's file, 
and appear to be part of extensive surveillance operations directed 
220. [d. 
221. [d. 
222. [d. Target B, at 208 (IE). 
223. [d. 209 (IE). 
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at that organization and some of its members. This indicates that 
various organizations are subjected to an information gathering pro-
cess that is more intense than is ordinarily employed, including, 
perhaps, 24 hour surveillance of the organizations' offices and meet-
ing places or of the homes of some of its members, or moving surveil-
lance of organization members as they go about their daily business. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the files of all organizations with 
which a target was associated during the period of surveillance must 
be explored in order to isolate and examine the source and meaning 
of the usually cryptic entries in the target's own file. For example, 
what is the significance of this entry?: . 
41. 5-6-73 Subj. observed in Wayne State area.224 
Comparison of addresses placed under surveillance with home 
addresses of the targets in the study sample reveals that many sur-
veillance crew entries resulted from extensive surveillance of a tar-
get's home, and indicates that not only public forums and events 
received intensive surveillance from the subversive units. 
Another type of nonspecific cross-referencing occurs when an 
entry included the name of a target as well as the names of other 
individuals, the other individuals likely being subjects of separate 
subversive files. This type of silent cross-referencing is illustrated by 
the following entries: 
42. 1-12-71 Subj. spoke at MCCC [Macomb County 
Community College] along with R, Y and Z, copy of speech 
in R's file. 225 [R is a nationally known performer and politi-
cal activist.] 
43. 12-30-70 Subj. attended rally at WSU [Wayne State 
University] sponsored by WPP [White Panther Party]. 
Speakers: Y, Z and R.226 
item 42 indicates that the subversive unit maintained a file on na-
tionally known activist R. The same reference to R in another tar-
get's file (item 43) suggests that R's file may contain information 
concerning the target in item 43, even though no specific references 
were made to R's file. 
Even basic personal history entries generate suspicion that in-
formation may be contained in other files, for example: "9/6/76 subj. 
now lives at-York,-Township, with his wife M, W, X, Y and Z, 
224. [d. 208 (IE). 
225. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE). 
226. [d. Target J, at 329 (IE). 
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per 142."227 Since the names of W, X, Y, and Z appear in this 
target's file, one might reasonably believe that this target's name, 
and information about him, might appear in files concerning W, X, 
Y, and Z. 
While a significant amount of information concerning a target, 
whether an individual or organization, may be found in files under 
the target's name or number, an equally significant amount of infor-
mation concerning a target can be found in subversive unit files of 
other individuals and organizations, as well as special 
"demonstration," "photo," and "surveillance" files. The number of 
different files that would have to be examined to discover all the 
information gathered on a single individual or organization would 
be staggering, particularly when an individual has participated in 
a large number of political organizations and events. Likewise, ex-
amination of large numbers of files would be required to determine 
the nature of police techniques and activities directed against a 
single target. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The presentation of the evidence from the study sample neces-
sitates some analysis and interpretation, not only of the structure 
and outline of the gathered information, as appeared previously in 
this Article, but also of its content. 
A. Method of Analysis 
1. Definitions and Categories 
The key to a system of analysis lies in the guideline chosen. 
Since the concern of this Article, and often of courts confronting 
police-spying litigation, is whether the police are improperly invad-
ing protected first amendment activities, the defhiition of 
"protected political activity" becomes the touchstone of this analy-
sis. 
The first step in the analysis is determining the "activity" ele-
ment of the definition of "protected political activity." If an I.E. 
Card entry does not indicate an activity, but rather indicates some 
other type of information, e.g., marital status or organizational affil-
iation, then that entry will be categorized as an "other item"-a 
miscellaneous category for items not "protected political activity." 
The second element of "protected political activity," and the second 
step in the analysis, is determining what activity is political and 
categorizing nonpolitical activity entries as "other items." 
227. See note 162 & accompanying text supra. 
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"Political" is used here in a broad sense, embracing all expressive 
activity involving the use of speech, press, association, assembly, or 
petition rights to present a point of view on an issue of public con-
cern. 
The final element of "protected political activity" is distin-
guishing between "protected" and "nonprotected" political activ-
ity. Political activity is not necessarily synonymous with expressive 
activity protected by the first amendment: bombings, kidnapping, 
hijacking, and other violence are often undertaken in the name of a 
political principle. There is no question that such events have oc-
curred, but their frequency and relation to peaceful political activity 
is much less clear. Of course, criminal acts have also occurred in the 
context of otherwise protected political activity, whether a street 
corner speech, leafletting, or a mass demonstration. The extent to 
which police have been involved with this latter .type of political 
violence, as provocateurs rather than gendarmes, raises serious 
questions of whether police surveillance of political activities is ac-
tually for legitimate violence- and crime-prevention purposes. Un-
fortunately, these questions are beyond the scope of this Article.228 
The distinction between protected and nonprotected political 
activity, for the purpose of this analysis, is determined by categoriz-
ing those items on the I.E. Cards that the police have characterized 
as "political," and that the United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined are entitled to first amendment protection. It should be 
noted that, in this analysis, the categorization of activity noted in 
the I.E. Card indexes and police reports has been drawn solely from 
the police descriptions of the activity contained in those documents. 
In all instances, it is the language and perception of the police that 
is used in categorizing and defining "protected political activity." 
After the primary analysis, categorizing items as either 
"protected political activity" or "other items," a further analysis 
will be made of the items falling in the "protected political activity" 
category. This further analysis will divide the items into those ap-
228. The issue of police use of informants and undercover agents in connection with 
political surveillance is a complex and fascinating one beyond the scope of this Article. See 
Crowley, Chapter 5, post. For a further discussion of this area, see generally CmZENS RE-
SEARCH & INVESTIGATION COMM., THE GLASS HOUSE TAPES (1973); C. PERKUS, COINTELPRO, 
THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLmCAL FREEDOM (1976); P. WATTERS & S. GILLERS, INvESTIGATING 
THE FBI (1973); Donner, The Confession of an FBI Informer, HARPER'S, December 1972; 
Donner, The Informer, THE NATION, April 10, 1954, at 678-99; Donner, Let Him Wear a Wolf's 
Head: What the FBI Did to William Albertson, 3 CIV. Lm. REV. 12 (1976); Marx, Thoughts 
on a Neglected Category of a Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the 
Informant, 80 AM. J. SOC. 402 (1974); Marx, Undercover Cops: Creative Policing or Constitu-
tional Threat, 4 CIV. Lm. REv. 34 (1977); Note, Domestic Intelligence Informants, The First 
Amendment and the Need for Prior Judicial Review, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 173 (1977}. 
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parently occurring in a public forum and those apparently occurring 
elsewhere-either on private property or on public property not ded-
icated in any way to public dissent. It is obvious that demonstra-
tions, rallies, parades, and picketing conducted in public streets, 
parks, and other areas raise different municipal concerns than non-
public forum activities. Likewise, nonpublic forum activities raise 
different constitutional concerns than public forum activities.229 
An item on an I.E. Card was placed in the public forum sub-
category if the police language indicated the location of the event 
as a public forum. In addition, the event was assumed to have 
occurred in a public forum if the police described the event as a 
"rally," "parade," or "demonstration," unless there was specific 
indication in the police description to indicate that the activity did 
not occur in a public forum. This means of subcategorizing is likely 
to favor placing more-rather than fewer-items In the public 
forum subcategory. Items included in the nonpublic forum subcate-
gory include large rallies and demonstrations occurring in private 
buildings as well as small gatherings in private homes and offices. 
On occasion, reference was made to documents in the study sample 
other than the I.E. Cards to determine whether an activity in an I.E. 
Card entry occurred in a public or nonpublic forum. 
2. Example of Analysis Method 
To illustrate and clarify the method of analysis explained 
above, consider the following detailed examination of the entries on 
the I.E. Card indexes for target H. Of the forty entries on the three 
cards which make up the I.E. Card index for H, thirty-six have been 
categorized as "protected political activity," and the remaining four 
have been categorized as "other items." Although it seems laborious 
to list all forty entries, it is, in reality, the shortest, most efficient 
means of demonstrating the system of analysis and it shows that the 
categorization is not difficult. 
Target H had the following seventeen entries for apparent pub-
lic forum protected political activity: 
(a) 12/24/1965 Chairman of "citizens for Peace in Viet-
nam" procession. 
(b) 2/1/1966 [anti-war group] parade and rally. 
(c) 3/26/1966 [anti-war group] parade and rally. 
(d) 10/26/1968 Anti-war parade. 
229. Police Surveillance of activities in private nonpublic forums also raise interesting 
questions with regard to the right of privacy and the fourth amendment, unfortunately this 
too is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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(e) 2/28/1969 Member of [legal organization] picketed 
Common Pleas Court (Landlord-Tenant). 
(f) 6/30/1969 Federal Building. . . demonstration. 
(g) 4/14/70 Sur obs subj. at GM Building protesting GM 
profits from Vietnam War. 
(h) 4/15/70 Sur obs subj. at Kennedy Square anti-war 
rally, appeared to be running rally. 
(i) 5/30/70 Coordinator for Memorial Day march and rally 
at Kennedy Square. 
(j) 6/15/70 Participated in rally at Cobo Hall against V. 
P. Agnew. 
(k) 10/31/70 Attended demo at Kennedy Square (Morato-
rium to End the War). 
(1) 11/24/70 Sub participated in anti-war demonstration 
at Federal Building sponsored by [anti-war organiza-
tions]. 
(m) 2/10/71 Per 321-spoke at [political organization] 
rally WSU [Wayne State University]. 
(n) 2/18/71 Attended a [anti-war organization] meeting 
at WSU. 
(0) 10/12/71 Subj. spoke at candlelight ceremony at City 
Hall sponsored by the [peace group]. 
(p) 4/29/72 Subj. obs. at Northland Shopping Center Mall 
at [anti-war organization] demonstration against ·the war. 
(q) 4/5/73 Subj. obs. frt. of Fed. Bldg., [anti-war organi-
zation] demo, U.S. out of SE Asia.230 
The 19 other entries contained in target H's index which relate 
to protected political activity apparently occurred in nonpublic for-
ums: 
(aa) 10/5/70 Attended a meeting at police hdgs. re: [anti-
war organization] march on 10/31/70 in Detroit (National 
Peace Action Day) anti-war march. 
(bb) 10/26/70 Subj. chaired steering comm. meeting of 
[anti-war organization]. 
(cc) 11/9/70 Subj. chaired a meeting of the [anti-war or-
ganization] .... Also talked about the 3 day Winter Sol-
dier Investigation (American War Crimes) to be held at 
Veterans Mem. Bldg. 12-1-2-3-70. 
(dd) 11/23/70 Chaired meeting of steering comm. of 
[anti-war organization] held at First Unitarian Church. 
230. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target H, at 249-51. 
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(ee) 12/4/6/70 Sub attended convention of {national 
peace group] and met with National Steering Committee 
at Chicago, Illinois. 
(ff) 11/21/70 Subj. spoke at a political meeting at U of D 
"[University of Detroit]. Spoke regarding the [peace 
group] convention to be held in Chicago ... per 321 rpt. 
(gg) 10/19/70 Member of steering comm. [national peace 
group]-see rpt. from Parma, Ohio PD dated 11/17/70 in 
[political organizational] file. Subj. representing [anti-
war organization]. 
(hh) 12/26-31/70 Attended [political organization] Natl 
Conc. NYNY. See MSP rpt dtd 1/7 /71 in [political organi-
zation] file. 
(ii) 1/16/71 Attended a [national peace group] meeting, 
-Howard, subj. was chairman. . 
(jj) 1/25/71 Sub attended and chaired meeting of [anti-
war organization] at-Third (steering committee). 
(kk) 2/8/71 Attended meeting of the [anti-war organiza-
tion] held at -Third. 
(11) 2/22/71 Chaired meeting of the [anti-war organiza-
tion] held at -Third. 
(mm) 4/5/71 Attended meeting of the [anti-war organiza-
tion] held at -Methodist Church .. 
(nn) 5/3/71 Chairman meeting of the [anti-war organiza-
tion] at-Methodist Chrch. 
(00) 7/2-4/71 Sub attended [anti-war organization] 
Conv. NYNY per source 1023. 
(pp) 7/1/71 Subject attended [anti-war organization] 
meeting, WSU per source 1023. 
(qq) 2/8/72 Sub. attended meeting of steering committee 
of [political organization]. 
(rr) 2/11/72 Sub. reported to have gone to Paris for leftist 
ralley re: Vietnam Peace Talks. 
(ss) 7/28/72 Sub. obs with wife exiting vehicle and enter-
ing [address of political organization].231 
917 
Finally, of the four entries in target H's index that were catego-
rized as "other items" because they do not relate to a specific politi-
cal activity, two are clearly of political nature (but not "activity"): 
12/15/69 Co-chairman of [anti-war organization]. 
231. ld. 
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12/15/70 Sub is reported to be a national coordinator for 
the [national peace group] (per report dated 12/10/70).232 
The other two items included in the "other items" category are 
nonpolitical: 
3/6/74 Subj. was divorced from his wife .... Subj. was 
plaintiff case no.73-[number]. 
74 Subj. is suppose [sic] to be married to [X] per source 
info.233 
There is, of course, much information not revealed by the I.E. 
Card entries, and the scope of this analysis is thereby limited. For 
example, it could be argued that the various "steering committee" 
meetings which H attended were for planning the imminent over-
throw of the government, the bombing of a government building, or 
the disruption of a public rally. This could be the case with any 
meeting between two or more human beings. This uncertainty is the 
reason for basing the categorization on police language in the en-
tries-their language reflects their concerns. If the primary police 
concern was the occurrence or planning of criminal, disruptive, or 
violent activity, the analysis presumes that some indication of that 
concern would appear as part of the index entry or in supporting 
reports. If the police choose not to make such indication, but rather 
to focus their index entry on the political views expressed, the politi-
cal nature of the organization or event, or both, then the analysis 
and categorization will not deviate from their choice of focus which 
precipitated the index entry. 
B. Analysis of The I.E. Card Indexes 
The above-described method of analysis and categorization 
was applied to all the Intelligence Exchange Card indexes in the 
study sample. There were nine such indexes, totalling twenty-five 
pages, which contained a total of 258 entries. Chart No.3 describes 
the statistical conclusions reached by examining these entries. 
Of the 258 entries in the nine I.E. Card indexes, 223 (86.4%) 
focused on protected political activity. Even more interesting is that 
130 (50.4%) of those entries were concerned with protected political 
activity occurring in nonpublic forums, and only ninety-three (36%) 
of the entries concerned political activity in public forums. Target 
A was under surveillance for ten years and had thirty-eight entries 
in her I.E. Card index, thirty-five (92%) of which concerned pro-
232. Id. 249-50. 
233. Id. 251. 
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A 5 38 35 9 26 3 10 
B 4 67 55 15 40 12 5 
C 1 4 4 1 3 o 2 
D 2 4 4 2 2 o 5 
E 2 13 6 2 4 7 3 
F 2 9 9 5 4 o 3 
G 3 25 22 10 12 3 6 
H 3 40 36 18 18 4 9 
J 3 58 52 31 21 6 11 
Total of 
column 25 258 223 93 130 35 54 
% in ea. 
category x 100% 86.4% 36% 50.4% 13.6% 
CHART NO.3 
tected political activity. Target J, who was under surveillance for 
eleven years, had flfty-eight entries, flfty-two (90%) of which con-
cerned protected political activity. What is just as important as the 
fact that an extremely high percentage of surveilled activity was 
protected by the flrst amendment is the fact that, in the fifty-four 
human years of surveillance represented by the matrix, there was 
not one reported act of serious violence, criminality, or public dis-
ruption. 
In the matrix of Chart No.3, a number of entries which were 
categorized as "other items" related to political information but did 
not involve any "activity," and were thus excluded from the 
"protected political activity" category. For example, consider the 
following entries: 
[In the index of Target A:] 
x 
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3/6/71 Sur. obs. [license no.] registered to X of 
-Mitchell, arrived at -Grand River, with a small child, 
entered with the child.234 
[Target B:] 
8/6/69 Info. received from Source that above is the presi-
dent of [political organization]. SEE [POLITICAL OR-
GANIZATION] FILE.235 
[Target H:] 
12/15/69 Co-chairman of [anti-war organization].236 
[Target J:] 
2/3/71 Info. per 219 subject professes to believe in An-
archy.237 
All four of these items relate to political information. The items 
concerning Targets B, H, and J are self-evidently political. The item 
concerning Target A is found to be political in nature when it is 
revealed that the addresses included in the entry are, at other points 
in A's I.E. Card index, identified as meeting places of a·particular 
political organization. It is quite likely, therefore, that this item 
concerning A could also warrant categorization as a nonpublic 
forum protected political activity item. Thus, even though nonac-
tivity and ambiguous items were categorized as "other items," 
nearly all of the thirty-five items could have been included in the 
political category. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The information and analysis in this study is useful in address-
ing two related concerns. First, it casts new light on the issue of 
whether the traditional police justifications for political surveillance 
comport with the product of their efforts. Second, it challenges cer-
tain presumptions and attitudes adopted by many judges in evalu-
ating court challenges to police surveillance activities. 
A. Police Justification vs. Police Product 
While the interests assertedly pursued by police through their 
political surveillance systems have been variously stated, almost all 
characterizations come down to the need to prevent disruptions, 
violence, and other criminal activity provoked or caused by political 
dissenters.238 Few persons would disagree with the police that pre-
234. [d. Target A, at 234. 
235. [d. Target B, at 206. 
236. [d. Target H, at 249. 
237. [d. Target J, at 330. 
238. For a general discussion of the government viewpoint of this issue, see A. BOUZA, 
POUCE INrELUGENCE: THE OPERATIONS OF AN INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (1976); D. SCHULTZ & L. 
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vention of crime and violence is a proper governmental function, but 
two critical questions remain unanswered, notwithstanding this 
concession. First, in the case of political surveillance, are the as-
serted justifications real, or are they only illusory and put forth to 
meet criticism and forestall further inquiry?239 Second, even if, to 
some extent, these justifications really are the concern of the police, 
are the various means allegedly used to meet the concerns related 
in any significant way to their accomplishment? 
The conclusions of this study appear to indicate that preven-
tion of crime or violence is not a substantial police concern in their 
use of political surveillance. First, all of the material examined is 
written in the police department's own words .. The documents re-
flect actual police concerns, and were never intended for public 
diclosure or examination. They therefore do not reflect any police 
need to "justify" their activities, but only what they actually did. 
Second, none of the information in the study sample-an accu-
mulation of fifty-four years of surveillance-relates to, or reflects a 
concern with, the prevention or solution of crimes or violence. Not 
a single violent or criminal act is discussed in the materials. The 
only violent or criminal acts suggested in the materials involve the 
activities of police or police informants. Third, virtually all of the 
information contained in the materials is concerned with the politi-
cal views and associations of the people placed under surveillance. 
While police have consistently maintained that their interest is 
in the prevention of law violation, and not in political surveillance 
causing infringement of first amendment rights, this study sample 
indicates that the opposite is true.240 The study sample reflects no 
evidence of violence or illegality, and further, no police concern with 
it. This, then, should begin to instruct courts that the dilemma 
which the police version of events has thrust upon us-that there 
are apparentiy irreconcilable demands between security and free 
expression-is not a real dilemma at all.241 Unless one is willing to 
equate dissent with criminality and protest with violence, there is 
NORTON, POUCE OPERATIONAL lNTEWGENCE (1973); P. SCHULTZ & K. SCO'IT, THE SUBVERSIVE 
(1973); Skousen, u.s. Police in a Cultural Crisis, 18 & 19 LAw AND ORDER (1970·71) (twenty· 
one part series that appeared monthly from Mar. 1970 to Nov. 1971). 
239. "[W]e can no longer seriously doubt that the main purpose of such activity is 
[the] political control of dissent or that the frequently advanced justifications of law enforce· 
ment or national security are often no more than a 'cover'." Donner, The Theory and Practice 
of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 27·39. 
240. See, e.g., Kelley, Message From The Director, 43 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 
(1974). 
241. Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 39. 
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little, if any, "security" interest which the present political surveil-
lance apparatus serves.242 
Even assuming that surveillance does, to some extent, serve the 
government interest of crime prevention, this study has conluded 
that, contrary to police assertions, there is a total absence of preci-
sion, care, or meaningful evalution involved in implementation of 
the system. Thus, it is impossible to tell how a decision is made to 
include an individual or organization in the surveillance pattern. 
The decision appears almost haphazard. The only sure guidepost is 
that it will be the political views or associations of a target which 
will trigger the initial inquiry. The police argument that innocent 
people are only occasionally or accidently included in the files along 
with subversives and potential lawbreakers is completely unsup-
ported by this study. Indeed, two of the study sample targets were 
kept under constant surveillance for over ten years without the 
slightest" hint of impropriety or illegality.243 
The operation of the system as demonstrated in the study was 
overbroad and undisciplined in another way. There appears to be 
no meaningful way to explain when and why certain surveillance 
techniques were used. Whether the technique was physical surveil-
lance, shadowing, use of informers, inquiries to third parties, or 
unlawful police intrusions, the "trigger" for the use of the technique, 
and the limits on it once implemented, appeared without rational 
pattern. 
Whether the "means" analysis of police political spying focuses 
on who the police include as a target, or on what the police do in 
implementing the system, the conclusion drawn from this study is 
the same: the system is drastically overbroad, and is structured in 
such a way that it would appear to be impossible to narrow its reach 
short of dismantling it. Since "who" is included is explicitly based 
on political views and associations, and "what" the police do is 
governed by no discernable standards whatever-except to further 
the ultimate goal of deterring dissent-there appears to be nothing 
legitimate to preserve. 
R. Enlightening Juc#cial Attitudes 
"How to inform the judicial mind ... is one of the most com-
242. "[T]he police often view protest as an intrusion rather than a contribution to our 
political processes." J. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: VIOLENT ASPECTS OF PROTEST AND 
CONFRONTATION 194 (1969). Professor Skolnick further adds that "in protest situations [the 
policeman's] political views often seem to control their actions." [d. 187. 
243. See Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Targets A and J. Targets B, C, E, F, G, 
and H were under surveillance for over five years. 
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plicated problems."244 A judge's performance on the bench is largely 
based upon his life experience. The conflict often arises as to 
whether judges are "in sympathy with the spirit of their times"245 
or merely with the spirit of the group "in which the accidents of 
birth or education or occupation or fellowship"246 have placed them. 
Yet one hopes that whatever prejudices judges may harbor will be 
substantially reduced if accurate information on- the critical issues 
is readily available. 
What this study hopes to convey to the judiciary is twofold. 
First, police activity in the area of political surveillance is the oppo-
site of what it is projected as being. Second, judicial withdrawal 
from the evaluation ~f the merits of challenges to surveillance acti-
vities reinforces the police myth that spying on political activity is 
.for the prevention of unlawful violence. At this juncture the courts 
are asked only to fulfill their constitutional mission to undertake the 
task of evaluating challenges to surveillance systems on the merits. 
The judicial system is no part of the national security-Iaw-
enforcement establishment. The courts should make a commitment 
to reconciliation of the conflicting demands of the government and 
citizen when actual disputes arise. Judges must recognize that re-
solving these cases in favor of the police by obscure holdings fash-
ioned around justiciability issues without a more thorough analysis 
is capitulation to, and acceptance of, the very assumptions under 
challenge. 
While in any individual case, the government may ultimately 
prevail on the merits, the decision would be reflective of mythology 
rather than reality if the court refuses to allow the challenger's 
claims to be litigated fully. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the 
Anderson247 decision, could not have appreciated the full irony of its 
comment when it deferred totally to the governmental position and 
stated: "We cannot know how little we know until we listen. "248 
Justice Marshall very aptly expressed the basic feeling that enve-
lops the domestic political surveillance system when he said: 
"[T]he value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it 
dropS."249 
244. Oral argument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in L. FRIED-
MAN, ARGUMENT 63 (1969). See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, 
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 
(1975). 
245. Id. at 1217, quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921). 
246. Id. 
247. Anderson v. Sills, 66 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). 
248. Id. at 228, 265 A.2d at 687. 
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DOB 6-17-48 w/1 
5/6, 125, Brn Hr, Grn Eyes 
SS 000-00-0000 
Newport, Southfield, Mich 
Meadow Lake, Birmingham 
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AUTO 65 Pont Cony 




10-5-70 attended meeting at 60 Harper, [organization] 
See rpt dtd 10-7-70 in [same] file. 
10-31-70 attended moratorium day anti war demo at 
Kennedy Sq. Sponsored by [organization] 
Detroit Police Department - Criminal Information Bureau 
Form C of D-102-CA (7-62) MASTER INDEX CARD D.P.D.381 
*The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the 
original Master Index Card. 
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APPENDIX B* 
925 
NAME FIRST MIDDLE 
ADDRESS 






members of: .... ; .... ; .... ; 
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Criminal Information Bureau 
PHOTO 
BIRTH DATE COLOR HEIGHT 
6-17-48 W/F 5'6" 
WEIGHT HAIR EYES 
125 brn. grn 
INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY DATE 
Crouter 2-28-71 
DPD NO CIB NO 
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-----------------. F 0 L D ------------------
MO SPECIALTY BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION 
._-------
CRIMINAL HISTORY 
6-15-71 info. 629-sub. reported as arrested at Canada Tunnel for poss. of 
Narcotics, released, no case. 
SEE INDEX CARD FOR DETAILED INFO. PRIOR TO FEB. 28,1972. 
REMARKS: 
10-5-70 to present has been very active with the [org], usually helps to 
make arrangements for transportation for out of town demonstrations or 
meetings. 
5-8-71 sub. attended meeting of the Steering Comm. of the [org] Wash. DC 
7-2, 4-71 attended [org.] convention NY, NY. 
11-18-72 subj att demo at Kennedy Square sponsored by [org.]. 
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE CARD 
ADDITIONAL DATA ON REVERSE 
*The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the 
original I.E. Card. 
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INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM 
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Date: January 10, 1973 
Commanding Officer, Intelligence Section 
Subject: MEETING OF [Anti-War Organization] 
Covered by Sergeant Stanley Perich and Patrolman Harold Mertz 
of the Intelligence Section, Subversive Detail. 
On Monday evening January 8, 1973 at 7 :30 P.M., the ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . held a meeting at the ... ' ......... . 
METHODIST CHURCH ................... Detroit, Michigan. 
There were 62 persons in attendance. 
The Chairman for the meeting was one, .................... . 
white/male of ............... Apt. No. 304, Detroit, Michigan. He 
is a tall male 23 years old/175 lbs. This subject is new to this area 
and active in the [Political] PARTY and the [Anti-war organiza-
tion]. NOTE - this subject was referred to in previous reports as 
The principle speaker was ....................... white/male 
Attorney of ........... Griggs, Detroit, Michigan. This subject 
is co-chairman of the [Anti-war organization], gave an inspirational 
speech explaining why the anti-war demonstration will be held in 
Washington D.C., explaining it is being conducted as a reminder to 
the American people that they did not vote for an escalation of the 
war in Vietnam, but instead voted for the peace promises given by 
Nixon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . called for a united effort for the 
upcoming D.C. demonstration against the President . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , white/female of ........... . 
Meadow Lake, Birmingham, Michigan. Dob: 6-17-48/5'6"/125/ 
brown hair/green eyes. This subject is co-ordinator for the [Anti-
war organization]. This subject gave a report on the planned 
happenings to occur prior to the groups leaving for Washington 
D.C. She detailed the plans for a heavy distribution of literature, 
showing a leaflet she wanted especially distributed to High Schools 
and College Campuses, and among all organizations which have shown 
t;The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the 
original Memorandum. 
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an interest in anti-war activities. She stated that the Coalition office 
is being swamped with phone calls from people with requests 
regarding transportation to the Capita1. ....................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . asked for help in setting up information and 
distribution centers throughout the Detroit area, so people would not 
have to go to the New Center area to pick-up literature. She pleaded 
with those present to help in the planning of the Capital demonstra-
tion . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , white/female of ...... Seward Apt No. 
403, Dob: 6-1-52 active in the [org.] and the [org.], gave a report 
on the transportation set-up. The Coalition has ordered six buses to 
date. They are not actually organizing car pools per se, but will do 
the best they can to line up a registration of available vehicles for the 
pool, and provide information to people calling them for same . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , male/black of ........ Townsend. This subject 
is a member or supporter of the ........ movement. On 10-25-72 
subjects brother, ............ was involved in a shooting at the 
Martin Luther King Jr. High Schoo1. ............ gave a report on 
the contacts he made with with labor organizations, reading off a 
lengthy list of labor indorsers for the D.C., demonstration. He called 
on others to get members of their own unions to endorse the 
demonstration. 
An Unknown Methodist minister, white/male gave a talk asking 
for closer co-operation among the anti-war activist, especially 
between the Coalition and the [another anti-war org] OFFICE. He 
stated that it is confusing to the outsider when they see the 
antagonism which exists between the two groups. 
Several persons from the audience gave run-downs of anti-war 
activities taking place at Wayne State University, University of 
Detroit, Ann Arbor, Lansing, etc. One said that there is a bus load 
of people leaving from Mt. Pleasant and some from Oxford Michigan. 
The ......... was heavily represented at this meeting with 
approximately 15 to 20 persons present. Four made talks with 
regard to ......... plans stating that they (the ........ ) plans to 
stay in D.C., to conduct a War and Racism seminar over the 
inaugural week-end. They invited the Coalition members to take 
part in the same. They said that the . . . . . . . . will cooperate with 
the Coalition in their endeavor with the anti-war movement. 
Discussions: speakers for the rally to be held at Kennedy Square 
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prior to the trip to Washington D.C. for the anti-war demonstration 
at inaugeration time ............. 's name was mentioned as one of 
the speakers. A long list of probable speakers were mentioned but 
nothing was confirmed as yet. The speakers will be announced at a 
press conference to be called by the coalition. 
A report meeting will be held as soon as possible after the D.C., 
demonstration. This meeting will also be used to make additional 
plans for future long range programs. 
The following were identified as being in attendance at the 
meeting: 
(Names of 22 individuals) 
LNU/WM 
The following is a registration of vehicles observed in the 
immediate area, occupants entered for the meetings: 
JWB- 69 VWCh JAMES Poe 
-305 70 Merc CH 
LLS- 70 ChevCh 
-264 68 Ford Sed 
MLT- 68 Chev Sed 
-402 64 Ford Ch 
JAMES/PATRICIA Griggs 
NATHAN Meadow Lake, Birmingham 
MAUROCE [sic] Washington, Ferndale 
CATHERINE Ward 
EUGENE Lindsay 
Sergeant Stanley Perich 
Subversive Detail 
Patrolman Harold Mertz 
Subversive Detail 
READ AND APPROVED: 
DENNIS J. MULLAHY 
Inspector - Commanding 
Intelligence Section 
